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Abstract 
 
 Negative emotion is often associated with emotion-congruent biases in 
information processing. However, rather than all negative emotion being 
associated with biases in all information processes, certain components of 
emotion appear to be associated with specific biases. This project examined two 
examples of specific associations. First, Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews 
(1988, 1997) have argued that anxiety is associated with biases on tasks 
involving priming, and depression is associated with biases on tasks involving 
elaboration. Second, most models of mood-congruent bias have given purely 
cognitive explanations; these models suggest that biases should be more closely 
associated with the cognitive symptoms than the somatic symptoms of 
depression (Horowitz, Nelson, & Person, 1997). Evidence is reviewed that 
suggests this may not be the case. These issues were examined in two 
experiments, each of which administered a broad range of tasks to a large sample 
of students. The experiments examined attention and judgement, and explicit, 
implicit, and autobiographical memory. It was hypothesised that Williams et al.'s 
(1988, 1997) predictions about the task-specific effects of anxiety and depression 
would be confirmed, and that the somatic symptoms of depression would have a 
greater influence on information processing biases than the cognitive symptoms. 
Emotion-congruent biases were not shown on every task, but on the tasks where 
biases were shown, the hypotheses were broadly confirmed. Strengths, 
limitations, and implications of the studies are discussed. Current cognitive and 
neuropsychological models of emotion are used to provide a possible explanation 
of the results. 
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 Information processing is the selection, transformation, storage, and use 
of information obtained from the senses. Emotion-related information processing 
biases occur when preferential treatment is given by the information processing 
system to material with specific emotional content. Biases in attention occur 
when either positive or negative information is preferentially processed by the 
system. Biases in memory occur when either positive or negative material is 
preferentially stored or recalled. Biases in judgement occur when ambiguous 
material is preferentially interpreted as either negative or positive. 
 Interest in emotionally biased information processing arose out of the 
empirical investigation of Beck’s cognitive model of depression (Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979). At the time that Beck introduced his model, the two 
dominant models of psychotherapy were Freudian and behavioural (Hunt, 1993). 
The Freudian tradition did not prove receptive to experimental investigations 
(Macmillan, 1991), and the behavioural paradigm was more concerned with 
external influences on behaviour than on the internal mental state of individuals 
(Beidel & Turner, 1986). In contrast, the cognitive model placed high importance 
on the thoughts and information processing of individuals, and the model has 
inspired a remarkable quantity of research (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). 
Although the cognitive model was first developed as a model of depression, it 
has since been extended to model many other mental disorders and difficulties, 
particularly anxiety (Clark et al., 1999). 
 Early research seemed to raise some challenges to the cognitive model. 
Beidel and Turner (1986) argued strongly that the cognitive model of depression 
was not supported by sufficient empirical evidence. They argued that though 
both behaviourists and cognitivists accept that cognition is a “description of 
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antecedent and consequent events” (Beidel & Turner, 1986, p. 313), these groups 
of theorists disagree about the causal nature of cognition. Cognitive theory 
postulates that cognition actively mediates the relationship between antecedent 
stimuli (what happens to the individual) and the individual’s resulting emotions 
and behaviours. In behavioural theory, thoughts “merely describe the relationship 
between antecedent events and their contingencies” (Beidel & Turner, 1986, p. 
313). Beidel and Turner (1986) argued that both behaviour itself, and thoughts 
and emotions, which they conceptualise as private behaviour, are fully 
determined by the known laws of learning. Presumably, by the known laws of 
learning they mean classical and operant conditioning, and perhaps modelling. 
 Beck’s cognitive theory has always been lent credibility by the success of 
the therapies that it inspired. However, Beidel and Turner (1986) pointed out that 
the cognitive and cognitive-behavioural therapy treatment plans that existed at 
that time all contained extensive use of known behavioural techniques. Thus, it 
was not possible to determine whether the effectiveness of cognitive treatments 
was due to the use of cognitive components, or was attributable to the 
behavioural components alone. Although more recently therapists have 
developed successful treatment plans they claim are purely based on the 
cognitive model (Free, 1999), it is possible to explain the mechanism of almost 
any plausible treatment plan in terms of the behavioural model, just as it is 
possible to explain the mechanism of behavioural treatments in terms of the 
cognitive model (Lilienfeld, 1995). Beidel and Turner (1986) also argued that 
treatments classified as cognitive-behavioural are no more effective than 
treatments classified as purely behavioural. Although purely behavioural 
treatment is uncommon in current clinical practice, the conclusion of equal 
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effectiveness remains consistent with more recent evidence on the treatment of 
depression (Jacobson, Martell, & Dimidjian, 2001) and the anxiety disorders 
(Feske & Chambless, 1995; Sweet & Loizeaux, 1991; van Blakom et al., 1994).  
 Thus, the final evaluation of the cognitive model requires theoretically 
oriented research. One critical research strategy is to investigate cognitive 
variables and examine whether they predict later psychopathology. Researchers 
have often chosen depression as the disorder of interest in these experiments. 
Beidel and Turner (1986) reviewed the relatively small literature that existed at 
that time, and found that measures of negative or purportedly irrational cognitive 
content correlate with depression, but do not predict it. At that time, a few studies 
of cognitive process had been conducted, but these studies examined only the 
association of cognitive processes with depression, not the causal direction of the 
relationship. Thus, Beidel and Turner (1986) concluded that negative cognitions 
are a correlate of depression, but that there was no evidence to show that they 
caused depression.1
In a more recent review, Gotlib and Krasnoperova (1998) found that most 
studies have shown that cognitive content does not predict later depression. 
However, these authors also reviewed evidence that cognitive processing is more 
negative in depression than in normal mood states. More importantly, they 
                                                 
1 It may come as a surprise to some that Beck has also explicitly stated that he does not believe 
that cognition causes depression (Beck & Steer, 1991). Rather, negative thoughts are 
conceptualised as an integral part of depression; “To conclude that cognitions cause depression is 
analogous to asserting that delusions cause schizophrenia” (p. 371). The theory holds that the 
activation of latent maladaptive schemas is the proximal mechanism of the development of 
depression, and thus the presence of such schemas represents a major vulnerability factor (Clark 
et al., 1999; schemas are defined later in this thesis). The distinction between a vulnerability 
factor and a causal factor that is not, in itself, necessary and sufficient to cause depression is not a 
clear one; suffice to say that evidence that can be used to support the existence of one can also be 
used to support the existence of the other. Clark et al. (1999) claim that Beck’s theory has often 
been misunderstood, but it would perhaps be more accurate to say that, especially in it’s early 
formulations, the theory was ambiguous about some issues (Williams et al., 1997), particularly 
the distinction between cognitive content and cognitive processes (Beidel & Turner, 1986). 
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reviewed several studies that suggested that negative cognitive processing may 
play a causal role in depression. Two types of evidence for causality exist. First, 
studies have examined whether negative biases in processing predict later 
depression. Second, and more commonly, studies have examined whether 
individuals who are known to be vulnerable to depression (for example, the 
previously depressed) show negative biases in cognitive processing. The issue of 
causality will be returned to in the discussion. 
It is partly because of the possible role of cognitive biases in the aetiology 
of anxiety and depression that these processes have become a focus of research 
interest. Most research has focussed on identifying cognitive biases that co-occur 
with anxiety and depression; the existence of such biases must first be 
determined before causality can be investigated. Cognitive biases are also a 
subject of interest in their own right, because even if they are a consequence of 
depression rather than a cause, they may help illuminate the functions of anxiety 
and depression (Mathews, 1990). In addition, Horowitz, Nelson, and Person 
(1997) suggest using a battery of measures of cognitive bias as an instrument for 
assessing level of depression. These possibilities are further explored later in this 
thesis. 
 This introduction reviews the literature on cognitive biases in information 
processing. First, there is a discussion of the main methodological issues that 
affect research on cognitive biases. Then there is a review of the way that 
emotional information is selectively attended to, interpreted, and stored in and 
retrieved from memory. Finally, there is a discussion of the way that Beck’s 
cognitive theory explains biases in these processes, and of some competing 
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theories. This discussion leads into an explanation of the purposes and 
hypotheses of the current studies. 
 
Methodological Issues
 
Anxiety and depression. Anxiety and depression are highly associated in 
both unselected and clinical populations (Clark & Watson, 1991a). 
Consequently, it has been suggested that studying their separate effects is 
meaningless. Ingram and Hamilton (1999) discount this suggestion, arguing that 
the stated intention of investigators is usually to investigate anxiety or 
depression, not general negative affect. Consistent with this argument, anxiety 
and depression are generally regarded as distinct enough to warrant separate 
review (Williams et al., 1997), and studies of depression have been reviewed 
without mentioning anxiety at all (Gotlib & Krasnoperova, 1998). These reviews 
have found that despite their close association, anxiety and depression are 
associated with different aspects of information processing. As discussed later in 
this introduction, these differences are of particular interest in the evaluation of 
different models of information processing biases. In addition, the failure to 
consider the potential effects of the high degree of association between anxiety 
and depression represents an important flaw in many studies of both emotional 
states. This issue will be discussed as appropriate in the relevant sections. 
Finally, many existing studies that have measured both anxiety and depression 
have measured anxiety using the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Unfortunately, 
this measure is not well suited to differentiating the effects of anxiety from those 
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of depression. Bieling, Antony, and Swinson (1998) found that the STAI-trait 
scale contains a factor that appears to measure depression rather than anxiety, 
consisting of items like “I am happy” (reverse scored) and “I feel like a failure”. 
Although Bieling et al. (1998) did not examine the state scale, this also contains 
items that appear to reflect depression rather than anxiety (for example, “I feel 
satisfied”, “I feel content”, both reverse-scored). Endler, Cox, Parker, and Bagby 
(1992) found that neither scale of the STAI successfully differentiated anxiety 
from depression, but that the Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scales (EMAS) 
did differentiate them. Similarly, Kennedy, Schwab, Morris, and Beldia (2001) 
found that neither scale of the STAI differentiated anxiety disorders from clinical 
depression. A primary purpose of the current investigation is to compare the 
effects of anxiety and depression across a variety of tasks, using measures that 
clearly discriminate between the two emotions. 
 
Clinical and nonclinical samples. Research into anxiety and depression 
has relied primarily on two kinds of studies. The first kind of study compares 
participants who meet the DSM-IV criteria for a mood or anxiety disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) to community controls. Participants 
who meet DSM-IV criteria are diagnosed using a structured or unstructured 
interview, and are often referred to as clinically anxious or depressed. The 
second kind of study compares participants with high scores on self-report 
inventories to participants with low scores. High-scoring individuals are often 
referred to as subclinically anxious or depressed, and studies that compare 
subclinical to nondistressed samples are often called nonclinical studies. Some 
members of subclinical samples may be clinically depressed or anxious, or even 
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undergoing treatment for their emotional distress, but investigators who use these 
samples do not generally have information about this. The use of subclinical 
samples has been the subject of recent debate in the literature (Coyne, 1994; 
Flett, Vredenburg, & Krames, 1997; Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 1993). One 
often-overlooked problem is that control participants in studies of subclinical 
depression are often extremely low scorers on self-report inventories measuring 
psychological distress, and this can potentially lead to artifactual results (Ingram 
& Hamilton, 1999). However, it is not altogether clear that studies of clinical 
depression always avoid this problem. The experiments reported in this thesis 
endeavour to use representative control groups. Coyne (1994) also points out that 
the distinction between clinical and nonclinical studies is often not made clear. 
The literature review that follows avoids this problem by clearly labelling studies 
as either clinical or nonclinical. The terms subclinically anxious and subclinically 
depressed are used in preference to the term dysphoria, because the latter is often 
taken to imply generalised distress, without distinguishing between anxiety and 
depression. As will become clear, there are important differences between the 
effects of subclinical anxiety and subclinical depression.  
 The continuity debate in depression has been a focus of much recent 
research attention. If depression is continuous, then subclinically depressed 
individuals are similar to clinically depressed individuals, but less extreme. If 
depression is discontinuous, then clinical depression is a qualitatively different 
phenomenon from subclinical depression. Coyne and Schwenk (1997) argue that 
subclinical depression, which they call “distress”, is associated with little 
impairment. However, every other major empirical study that has directly 
addressed this question has shown that subclinical and clinical depression are 
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continuous on most of the attributes investigated, and that subclinical depression 
is a condition with serious consequences for the lives of those affected by it 
(Cox, Enns, Borger, & Parker, 1999; Gotlib, Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 1995; 
Lewinsohn, Solomon, Seeley, & Zeiss, 2000; Ruscio & Ruscio, 2000). The 
continuity of anxiety appears to have been a relatively neglected topic, perhaps 
because the issue is complicated by the assortment of different anxiety disorders, 
including the highly prevalent specific phobias. It is worth noting that the 
cognitive model firmly takes the view that anxiety and depression are continuous 
entities (Clark et al., 1999). It is thus appropriate to test the model with 
experiments that assume continuity. 
 Even if depression is truly a continuous condition, it is possible for 
studies labelled nonclinical and studies labelled clinical to arrive at discrepant 
results. There are several reasons for this. First, because differences between 
participants in studies of clinical depression are relatively large, and differences 
between participants in studies of subclinical depression are relatively small, at a 
given sample size clinical studies have more power to detect differences between 
groups. Second, subclinical and clinical populations differ in ways other than 
severity of depression; for example, clinical participants are more likely to have 
shown help-seeking behaviour and to be undergoing treatment, and they are less 
likely to have been selected from a student sample. The last difference means 
they are likely to be lower in IQ (Crawford & Allan, 1997), which may affect 
some cognitive tasks. Moreover, is possible that some features of depression are 
continuous, and some are discontinuous (Flett et al., 1997). In particular, it 
remains possible that subclinical and clinical depression have discontinuous 
impacts on information processes. The review detailed below finds that clinical 
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and nonclinical studies tend to find similar results in terms of information 
processing biases, although findings are sometimes weaker or less consistent in 
nonclinical studies. This is what the continuity view predicts. However, certain 
memory deficits appear to be associated with clinical, but not subclinical, 
depression, as predicted by a discontinuity view. 
 Although as argued by Coyne (1994), nonclinical studies do suffer from 
limitations, they also possess certain strengths that clinical studies do not. First, 
and most importantly for the current studies, nonclinical samples are useful for 
examining the relative effects of different components of negative mood. 
Clinically depressed individuals tend to be highly anxious, and clinically anxious 
individuals tend to be somewhat depressed (Clark & Watson, 1991a). Within 
clinically depressed samples, level of depression and level of anxiety are very 
closely related (Enns, Cox, Parker, & Guertin, 1998). The use of nonclinical 
samples allows experiments to more easily disentangle the differing information 
processing correlates of anxiety and depression, which is a main aim of this 
project. Similarly, the other main aim of this project is to compare the effects of 
the somatic and cognitive symptoms of depression. Clinically depressed 
individuals are likely to be very high on both types of symptoms, and so the use 
of nonclinical samples is a more powerful method for disentangling their effects. 
Second, nonclinical samples are easier to recruit, a practical advantage that can 
lead to the important methodological advantage of greater statistical power. 
Third, studies of information processing in clinical populations have difficulty 
controlling demand effects; participants presumably know that they have been 
selected into the study because they are anxious or depressed, and may feel that 
they are expected to behave in an anxious or depressed way. Studies using 
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nonclinical populations can more easily minimise demand effects by concealing 
the purpose of the study for the duration of the experiment. Fourth, given that 
many depressed individuals do not seek help or undergo treatment, subclinical 
samples may be more representative of depressed people in general than are 
patients recruited from outpatient clinics (Vredenburg et al., 1993). Fifth and 
finally, the use of nonclinical samples may be less problematic for studies of 
information processing bias than for studies on certain other topics concerning 
depression or anxiety. Subclinically depressed students and clinically depressed 
outpatients have different demographic features (Coyne, 1994), and this is a 
problem for the investigation of contextual factors like daily stressors. However, 
demographics are of less concern to the study of basic cognitive processes, 
because cognitive psychology’s assumption of uniformity of cognitive 
architecture implies that the minds of people from different demographic groups 
will function in a similar manner (Coltheart, 2002). 
These considerations suggest that it is important to conduct both clinical 
and nonclinical studies. For this reason, both clinical and nonclinical studies will 
be reviewed, but clearly labelled according to type of participant selection 
procedure used. The experiments in this thesis use nonclinical samples, because 
of their greater suitability for addressing the main aims of the project. 
 
Statistical power. Cohen (1988) reviews evidence that insufficient power 
is a substantial methodological problem in research in social, experimental, and 
clinical psychology. An experiment’s statistical power is the likelihood that it 
will find a significant effect in a sample, given that an effect of a certain size 
really does exist in the population from which the sample is randomly selected. 
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Because effect sizes in many types of research are necessarily small, and 
participant numbers are often restricted by practical concerns, statistical power is 
often low. Cohen (1988) discusses meta-analyses that find that in many areas of 
psychology, the statistical power of the average published study to detect a small 
effect size is around 50%. This means that even if a small effect size does exist, 
50% of studies are likely to miss it, although publication bias may mean that not 
all of these studies will be published. This problem is likely to confuse the 
interpretation of research, and slow progress in an area, particularly when 
statistical power is not explicitly considered. At the extreme, Meehl (1990) 
argues that the combination of insufficient statistical power and the (partly 
consequential) submission and publication biases against studies with null results 
has rendered the results of whole fields of study uninterpretable. Unhappily, in 
the experimental cognitive abnormal psychology area, both limitations on effect 
size obtainable and limitations on the number of participants that can be recruited 
for a given experiment seem particularly intractable. Matt, Vazquez, and 
Campbell (1992) argue that the typical existing study has very low power to 
detect the small effect sizes that are being investigated. Before sufficient 
comparable studies have accumulated to allow meta-analysis, the best that can be 
done in this situation is to fully disclose the expected power of an experiment in 
the case of null results, and for power issues to be considered particularly 
carefully by narrative reviewers. At present, such considerations are rare; for 
example, in their review of the inconsistent findings in some areas of research in 
cognition and emotion, Williams et al. (1997) do not mention the issue of 
statistical power at all. Consideration of statistical power is also rare in the 
reporting of single experiments, though it may have recently been increasing in 
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frequency. This thesis will discuss degree of statistical power in cases where null 
results are found. 
 
Mood and Memory 
 
Autobiographical memory. Autobiographical memory has long been 
thought to play a particularly important role in the emotional disorders 
(Williams, 1992). However, as several reviewers have noted, it is particularly 
difficult to study, because it is difficult to determine whether differences in 
valence of memories recalled are best accounted for by biased recall or by actual 
differences in life history (Blaney, 1986). Perhaps for this reason, there have 
been relatively few investigations examining naturally occurring mood and its 
relationship to valence of recalled events. 
Mayo (1983) conducted a study of university students and staff. He found 
that valence of autobiographical memories produced in association to neutral cue 
words was not significantly related to despondency, anxiety, or happiness, as 
measured by simple visual analogue scales, but was related to personality, as 
measured by the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ). However, this study 
was not a fair comparison of the effects of mood and personality, as the EPQ is 
likely to be a more valid and reliable measure of personality than visual analogue 
scales are of current mood. Also, the analogue scales used in this experiment rate 
immediate mood, while depression and anxiety inventories rate mood over the 
preceding one or two weeks. Mayo (1989) examined a similar population and 
found similar but weaker effects of personality, and not all of his earlier findings 
were replicated in this study. Anxiety was also measured using the STAI-Trait, 
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and was associated with the production of unhappier memories. Immediate mood 
state was also measured, but correlations with valence of recalled memories were 
not reported. 
In addition to looking at the emotional valence of freely recalled 
memories, researchers have looked at the time taken to recall either happy or 
unhappy memories. The results have sometimes but not always been supportive 
of the mood-congruent hypothesis. Williams and Scott (1988) found that 
depressed individuals took longer to produce happy memories than did 
nondepressed individuals. Richards and Whittaker (1990) also found a mood-
congruent effect: self-reported depression was related to response latency for 
negative memories, and self-reported anxiety was related to response latency for 
positive memories. Similarly, MacLeod, Andersen, and Davies (1994) found that 
self-ratings of positive and negative affectivity predicted recall latency for 
autobiographical memories cued by the terms used in the positive and negative 
affectivity schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). However, 
Kuyken and Dalgleish (1995) found that depressed individuals were no different 
from nondepressed individuals in their pattern of response latencies for positive 
and negative events. 
As already noted, it is uncertain whether these mood-congruent results 
are due to biased cognitive processes or to veridical differences in participants’ 
life histories. One way of avoiding the confounding of biases in recall with 
veridical differences in events is to capitalise on natural variations in mood. 
Fogarty and Hemsley (1983) found that valence of recalled memories changes in 
a manner congruent with recovery from clinical depression. Similarly, Hammen, 
Miklowitz, and Dyck (1986) asked college students to provide examples of their 
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past behaviours that were consistent with positive or negative words that they 
had judged to be self-descriptive. Subclinically depressed participants provided 
fewer positive examples, and many more negative examples, than nondepressed 
participants. Participants who had recently been subclinically depressed 
performed identically to the stably nondepressed participants. Thus, both studies 
seem to show that current mood state, rather than veridical differences in life 
history, is responsible for the recall of more negative events in depression. 
However, Blaney (1986) argued that because in studies like the ones described 
above changes in mood occur over a long time frame, the findings of studies with 
this design could be related to a change in the pleasantness of the events that 
participants had recently experienced, rather than to a mood-related change in 
recall bias. Clark and Teasdale (1982) avoided this problem by investigating 
valence of autobiographical events recalled at different times of the day. The 
participants were clinically depressed individuals with strong diurnal variation in 
depression, and they recalled autobiographical events that varied in valence in a 
manner that was congruent with current mood. Consistent with the studies 
already discussed, this study suggests that depression is associated with a 
negative bias in autobiographical recall. 
A second way of avoiding the confounding of biases in recall and actual 
differences in events is to artificially manipulate mood. Teasdale and Fogarty 
(1979) found that when participants were inducted into depressed or elated 
moods using a variant of the Velten self-statement procedure, their recall 
latencies for pleasant and unpleasant memories were affected in a mood-
congruent way. Teasdale and Russell (1983) conducted a similar study without 
constraining participants to produce either pleasant or unpleasant memories. 
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Instead, participants responded to neutral cue words by freely recalling memories 
of any emotional valence. The authors replicated their earlier response latency 
finding, and also found that negative mood induction was associated with the 
production of less pleasant autobiographical memories. However, Ehrlichman 
and Halpern (1988) argued that the effects produced in these studies could have 
been produced by non-emotional cognitive mechanisms related to the semantic 
content of the self-statements used to induce the mood. To avoid this problem, 
these authors used pleasant or unpleasant odours to induce positive or negative 
mood, and found that individuals in the pleasant odour condition recalled happier 
memories than those in the unpleasant odour condition. More recently, Kumari, 
Hemsley, Cotter, Checkley, and Gray (1998) investigated the effects of a placebo 
and of the mood-lowering drug haloperidol on recall of personal memories. They 
found that the drug caused participants to recall unhappier memories. It could, 
however, be argued that the effect of the drug on recall was directly biologically 
mediated, rather than caused by mood itself, an idea consistent with the fact that 
the change in valence of recalled events was only partially mediated by self-rated 
mood. Despite some individual methodological weaknesses, in combination 
these consistent strands of evidence suggest that induced mood-congruent 
autobiographical recall is a robust and genuine effect. 
Clinical observation has suggested that depressed individuals are not only 
more negative in the memories that they recall, but that they are also less able to 
recall certain kinds of specific events (Williams, 1992). This lack of specificity 
has also been the focus of research attention. Overgeneral recall is the inability to 
remember specific events from one’s own life - that is, events that occurred only 
once and were less than one day in duration (Williams, 1996). Early research 
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found that overgeneral memory was found in suicide attempters (Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986), but more recent investigations have focused on the 
relationship between depression and overgeneral memory. Kuyken and Dalgleish 
(1995), Moore, Watts, and Williams (1988), and Williams and Scott (1988) have 
all found that clinically depressed individuals produce more overgeneral 
memories than do controls; this effect seems to be quite consistent. Wessel, 
Meeren, Peeters, Arntz, and Merckelbach (2001) found that overgeneral memory 
was specific to major depressive disorder, and was not related to the presence of 
an anxiety disorder or to self-rated depression severity. However, Wessel et al. 
(2001) did not examine any participants diagnosed with post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and other studies have found that this specific anxiety disorder is 
associated with overgeneral memory (McNally, Lasko, Macklin, & Pitman, 
1995). Consistent with Wessel et al.'s (2001) finding that self-rated depression 
was unrelated to overgeneral recall, Merckelbach, Muris, and Horselenberg 
(1996) investigated a large, unselected student sample, and found that 
overgeneral memory was not associated with trait anxiety, neuroticism, or 
depression, all as measured using self-report inventories. Williams, Williams, 
and Ghadiali (1998) have obtained similar findings, although it is doubtful that 
their sample size of 15 would provide sufficient power to detect mood related 
differences. Merckelbach et al. (1996) did find that overgeneral memory was 
associated with left-hemispheric thinking style as measured by a paper-and-
pencil questionnaire. The influence of thinking style on information processing is 
discussed in more detail later in this introduction. 
Merckelbach et al.'s (1996) finding that depression, as measured by self-
report inventory, is unrelated to overgeneral memory is more puzzling than it 
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might seem. These authors argued that this finding means that overgeneral 
memory is a stable trait that predicts vulnerability to clinical depression, rather 
than an unstable product of transient mood disturbance. Yet persons scoring 
highly on self-report depression inventories are more likely than persons scoring 
low on these inventories to report past or present clinical depression, and are also 
more susceptible to developing clinical depression in the future (Gotlib et al., 
1995). Thus even if we assume that only clinical depression as diagnosed with a 
structured interview produces overgeneral memory, many of those who score 
highly on depression inventories fit this criterion, and this should increase the 
mean level of overgeneral recall found in this group. There are three possible 
reasons that this might not occur. First, there could be a subgroup of high scorers 
who are lower in overgeneral recall than low scorers, to balance out the 
overgenerality of the clinically depressed individuals (Dawes, 2001). There is no 
obvious theoretical reason for this to occur. Second, a relationship might in fact 
exist. In this case, the null results of the one experiment that has examined 
overgeneral memory in nonclinical depression would have been due to chance; 
this is possible as Merckelbach et al. (1996) did not report the power of their 
study. Third, findings of overgeneral memory in clinically depressed individuals 
could be due to some methodological artefact; for example, the use of 
antidepressants in the clinical groups, which existing experiments have made 
only indirect efforts to control. Experiment 2 of this thesis seeks to further 
confirm Merckelbach et al.'s (1996) finding that overgeneral memory is unrelated 
to nonclinical depression, and will report the statistical power of the comparison. 
Studies examining whether overgeneral memory plays a casual role in 
depression have produced mixed results. Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibetseder, and 
Emotion-Congruent Information Processing  19 
Fartacek (2000) found that women who had been previously depressed were 
more overgeneral in their memories than women who had not been previously 
depressed. However, Wessel et al. (2001) found that previous depression was not 
related to overgeneral recall. Similarly, some authors but not others have found 
evidence for predictive validity of overgenerality in autobiographical memory. 
Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, and Ferrier (1993) found that overgeneral recall 
predicted poor response to antidepressant treatment. Brewin, Reynolds, and 
Tata's (1999) study did not replicate this finding, but it did find that overgeneral 
memory was associated with the presence of spontaneous intrusions of 
distressing memories, and that this latter variable predicted poor treatment 
response. More consistently, overgeneral recall has been found to be associated 
with poor social problem solving (Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996; Sidley, 
Whitaker, Calam, & Wells, 1997), although the authors of these studies did not 
control for the possible mediating effect of IQ. This is an important flaw, because 
the ability to produce specific autobiographical memories is strongly related to 
IQ (Williams et al., 1998), and social problem solving is also likely to be related 
to IQ, because performance on most complex intellectual tasks is associated with 
this variable (Jensen, 1998). Although evidence for the causal role of overgeneral 
memory in depression could be seen as weak, some attention has already been 
paid to the possibility of using interventions to reduce overgeneral recall 
(Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2000; Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 
2000). 
In summary, studies of natural variation in mood have found that 
autobiographical memory is mood-congruent. Mood manipulation studies have 
demonstrated that part of this effect is due to differences in cognitive processes 
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rather than differences in veridical life history. At this stage, there is insufficient 
evidence to determine whether depression, anxiety, or both are driving the effect. 
In contrast, overgeneral recall characterises major depression, suicidality, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder, but is not characteristic of the other anxiety 
disorders or of nonclinical disturbed mood states.  
Nonautobiographical memory. Studies of material learnt in the laboratory 
have the advantage that there is precise control over the stimuli to which the 
participants are exposed. They also have the disadvantage that the material to be 
recalled is less personally relevant. Some authors have hypothesised that this 
aspect of the word learning tasks may weaken any effects found (Blaney, 1986). 
 Mood congruence in nonautobiographical memory has been extensively 
investigated. For this reason, the literature will not be reviewed in detail: instead, 
the conclusions of various existing reviews will be discussed, as will a selection 
of the most recent studies. The majority of studies have investigated explicit 
memory, that is, participants were explicitly asked to recall a previously 
presented word set. 
 Blaney (1986) conducted the earliest significant review of studies of 
mood and memory. Anxiety was not addressed by the review. Blaney (1986) 
concluded that there was evidence for mood-congruent memory in induced 
mood, naturally occurring nonclinical depression, and clinical depression. He 
also concluded that mood-congruence does not appear when self-referent 
learning of the materials is explicitly discouraged during the learning phase (for 
example, when participants are asked to count the number of times the letter E 
appears in each word). More recently, Matt et al. (1992) conducted a meta-
analytic review of published studies of mood-congruent recall. Again, anxiety 
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was not discussed. For naturally occurring mood, they found evidence that 
nondepressed individuals showed a positive bias in recall, dysphoric individuals 
showed even-handed recall, and clinically depressed individuals showed a 
negative bias in recall. Statistical tests generally suggested homogeneity of effect 
size – that is, there was no evidence that methodological differences between 
studies had any effect on the results obtained, except for in the case of induced 
elated mood. However, consistent with Blaney (1986), Matt et al. (1992) noted 
that there was a trend for non-self-referent encoding of information to be less 
likely to yield mood-congruent recall.  
 Matt et al. (1992) also make two important methodological points. First, 
the mean effect sizes found were small to very small according to Cohen's (1988) 
effect size conventions. Matt et al. (1992) calculate that most studies of mood-
congruent recall are too small to have sufficient power to detect the effects of 
interest; for example, if the effect of clinical depression on mood-congruent 
recall is of the average size calculated in the review, a typical study of clinical 
depression has only a 13% chance of correctly finding that clinically depressed 
individuals are negatively biased in their recall. Second, Matt et al. (1992) 
conducted analyses to determine how many unpublished studies with null results 
would need to exist for the average effect size found by a review that also 
included these studies to be nonsignificant; in all cases but that of the positive 
bias in nondepressed participants, this number was small, and so Matt et al. 
(1992) suggest caution in interpreting their meta-analytic findings. 
 There is one final notable finding of this review. As discussed in the 
section on methodology, individuals classified as nondepressed in research 
studies often score appreciably lower on depression inventory score than the 
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average of the population. Matt et al. (1992) found that “nondepressed” 
individuals actually showed a stronger positive bias than unselected, induced 
elated, individuals. This suggests that the positive bias shown by the control 
groups in these studies is the result of the selection process used, and is not 
necessarily characteristic of the general population. 
 A significant number of studies examining mood-congruent memory have 
been published since Matt et al. (1992) conducted their meta-analytic review, but 
subsequent reviews have been narrative rather than meta-analytic. These reviews 
have consistently argued that both nonclinical and clinical depression produce 
mood-congruent recall, but that anxiety rarely does so (Dalgleish & Cox, 2000; 
Ellis & Moore, 1999; Gotlib & Krasnoperova, 1998; Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000; 
MacLeod & Rutherford, 1998; Williams et al., 1997). The results of empirical 
studies subsequent to Matt et al.'s (1992) review continue to be mixed; for 
example Denny and Hunt (1992) found that clinically depressed individuals were 
more negative in their recall than controls, but Banos, Medina, and Pascual 
(2001) did not. Similarly, Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, and Fuller (1992) 
found that subclinically depressed individuals were more negative in their recall 
than controls, but Lang and Craske (1997) did not.  
Finally, investigators have also examined mood-congruent biases in 
implicit memory. Implicit memory for word lists occurs when responses are 
affected by previously presented information without the participants being 
aware of this. Implicit memory is often assessed using either word stem or word 
fragment completion tasks. For example, Mathews, Mogg, May, and Eysenck 
(1989) asked participants to imagine themselves in scenes related to a number of 
positive, negative, and neutral words. They then completed a nonsemantic 
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distracter task, and then a word-stem completion task. The word-stem completion 
task involved thinking of words to complete three letter stems (for example, 
FAI_______); for some of the word stems, one possible answer was a word the 
participant had been previously exposed to in the imagination task. Participants 
were more likely complete a word stem with a given word if they had been 
previously exposed to it, thus demonstrating implicit memory. More importantly, 
the clinically anxious participants showed relatively more implicit memory for 
the negative material than did the control participants. This demonstrated a 
mood-congruent implicit memory bias. Studies have found that both clinical and 
nonclinical levels of anxiety are related to mood-congruent implicit memory 
(Eysenck & Byrne, 1994; Lang & Craske, 1997; Mathews, Mogg et al., 1989). 
However, Banos et al. (2001) did not find an implicit memory bias in a group of 
panic disordered patients. In contrast to the overall findings for anxiety, several 
studies have found that neither clinical nor nonclinical depression are associated 
with a mood-congruent bias in implicit memory (Banos et al., 2001; Danion, 
Kauffmann-Muller, Grange, Zimmerman, & Greth, 1995; Denny & Hunt, 1992; 
Lang & Craske, 1997; Watkins et al., 1992). Roediger and McDermott (1992) 
suggested that depression might be associated with mood-congruent bias in 
conceptual, but not perceptual, implicit memory. They made this suggestion 
because it had been hypothesised that depression affects elaboration, rather than 
perceptual priming (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; see also the 
section on theory in this thesis). Watkins, Vache, Verney, and Mathews (1996) 
tested the conceptual-perceptual hypothesis by conducting a conceptually-based 
implicit memory task with clinically depressed university students. Their 
encoding task was an imagination task, their recall task was a free-association 
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task, and they found mood-congruent implicit memory. Watkins, Martin, and 
Stern (2000) conducted a similar study involving two perceptual implicit 
memory tasks and two conceptual implicit memory tasks – the free association 
task used in their 1996 study, and a word-retrieval task that required participants 
to produce words to fit supplied definitions. Participants showed mood-congruent 
recall on the word-retrieval task, but not on the other three tasks. The authors 
concluded that depression-congruent implicit memory occurs only on conceptual 
tasks, but that even then the effect is dependent on the exact experimental 
method used. Somewhat inconsistent with this conclusion and the other existing 
evidence, Ruiz-Caballero and Gonzalez (1994) did find a depression-congruent 
perceptual implicit memory bias in subclinically depressed participants using a 
word-stem completion task. 
 Some investigators have taken a less conventional approach to the 
measurement of implicit memory, by using a subliminally primed lexical 
decision task (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 1996; Bradley, Mogg, & Williams, 
1994, 1995; Scott, Mogg, & Bradley, 2001). In these experiments, the target 
stimuli are strings of letters, and the participants’ task is to decide whether or not 
these stimuli form valid words. Some stimuli are preceded by subliminally 
presented prime words. When participants classify primed stimuli as words more 
rapidly than unprimed stimuli, priming has occurred. When mood-congruent 
stimuli are primed more than mood-incongruent stimuli, mood-congruent bias 
has occurred. In these experiments, the prime word could either be the same as 
the target word (repetition priming) or a closely related word (semantic priming). 
The repetition priming experiments used upper case letters as primes, but lower 
case letters as target words, in an effort to ensure that any effect was due to 
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conceptual, rather than perceptual, processes. However, many letters do share 
perceptual properties between their upper and lower case forms, so classification 
of this task as conceptual or perceptual is ambiguous (Scott et al., 2001). Bradley 
et al. (1994, 1995, 1996) found that both clinical and nonclinical participants 
showed mood-congruent biases on the repetition priming task. Scott et al. (2001) 
found that nonclinical participants did not show mood-congruent biases on the 
repetition priming task, but did show mood-congruent biases on the semantic 
priming task. Across the series of experiments, mood-congruent bias was more 
strongly and consistently associated with depression than with anxiety. Overall, 
the findings are consistent with the view that depression is associated with 
conceptual implicit memory bias (Scott et al., 2001). However, one limitation of 
the subliminal priming paradigm is that the effects appear to occur over a limited 
duration; no mood-congruency effects were found after a delay of two seconds 
(Scott et al., 2001). Thus, it is unclear that these mood-congruency effects are in 
fact due to memory processes. Bradley et al. (1994, 1995, 1996) did also include 
a supraliminal priming condition that had a longer delay between presentation of 
prime and target stimuli. Consistent with their other findings, they found 
depression-congruent processing, but as previously noted it is unclear whether 
these experiments were measuring perceptual or conceptual implicit memory. 
 In summary, depression appears to sometimes produce a bias in 
conceptual implicit memory, but to less often produce a bias in perceptual 
implicit memory. Anxiety appears to produce a bias in perceptual implicit 
memory, but the effects of anxiety on conceptual implicit memory have not been 
sufficiently investigated. Because anxiety and depression co-vary, but research in 
this area has typically investigated only one of these variables, it is hard to 
Emotion-Congruent Information Processing  26 
determine whether the effects demonstrated by individual studies are due to 
anxiety or to depression. The need for a study that concurrently investigates both 
anxiety and depression, and both conceptual and perceptual implicit memory, is 
apparent. Experiment 1 of this thesis was designed to address this need. 
 Studies have also examined whether emotional state affects ability to 
explicitly recall neutral materials. For measures of explicit memory, the pattern 
of findings is similar to that already described for overgeneral recall in 
autobiographical memory. Burt, Zembar, and Niederehe (1995) conducted a 
meta-analysis that found that clinical depression was associated with an explicit 
memory deficit that was small to moderate in Cohen's (1988) effect size terms. 
The effect was larger in inpatient than outpatient samples. The available evidence 
suggests that no explicit memory deficit is associated with either subclinical 
depression (Gotlib, Roberts, & Gilboa, 1996) or anxiety disorders that are not 
accompanied by comorbid depression (Burt et al., 1995). The similarity of the 
mood states that are associated with impairment of explicit wordlist recall and 
with impairment of the ability to produce specific autobiographical memories 
suggests a need to investigate whether a common mechanism causes both 
impairments, but existing research does not address this question. Experiment 2 
contains a preliminary investigation of this matter. 
 Finally, studies have examined whether depression is related to deficits in 
implicit memory. Clinical depression does not seem to be associated with deficits 
in perceptual implicit memory (Burt et al., 1995; Jenkins & McDowall, 2001), 
but recent evidence suggests it may be associated with deficits in conceptual 
implicit memory (Jenkins & McDowall, 2001). There is no corresponding 
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evidence that a similar deficit in conceptual implicit memory occurs in 
subclinical depression. 
 In summary, depression seems to be closely related to explicit and 
conceptual implicit memory biases and deficits, and anxiety seems to be closely 
related to perceptual implicit memory biases. However, these distinctions are not 
always clear cut and consistent. The picture is blurred by methodological and 
population differences between studies, the difficulty of attracting enough 
participants to allow sufficient power to detect the effects of interest, and the 
failure of many authors to measure both anxiety and depression within the same 
study. 
  
Mood and Attention 
 
Studies of attentional processing in anxiety and depression have adopted 
two main approaches. The first approach has been to measure interference 
effects. Interference effects occur when participants perform worse on a non-
emotional task when emotional stimuli are used. The experimenters who use 
interference tasks assume that the interference effects occur when the emotional 
stimuli capture the attentional resources of the participants. The second approach 
to examining attention in depression and anxiety has been to measure facilitation 
effects. Facilitation effects occur when participants perform better on a non-
emotional task when task stimuli and emotional stimuli are presented in the same 
spatial region. The experimenters who conduct this research assume that 
facilitation effects occur when the participant’s attention is automatically 
oriented towards the emotional stimuli.  
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Attentional interference has usually been measured using the emotional 
Stroop task. In the emotional Stroop task, participants name the colours of 
neutral or emotionally valenced words. The theory behind the task is that 
emotionally disturbed individuals will be more distracted by negative stimuli, 
and will thus be slower to name the colour of these stimuli. There has been a 
large number of studies utilising the emotional Stroop task, and only a 
representative sample is reviewed here. Many studies have found that anxious 
participants have shown an emotional Stroop interference effect (Williams et al., 
1997), so the review will focus on the more controversial issue of whether there 
is an emotional Stroop effect in depression. Gotlib and Krasnoperova (1998) and 
Horowitz et al. (1997) argue that depression is characterised by increased Stroop 
interference for negative stimuli. Williams, Mathews, and MacLeod (1996) also 
appear to support this position. Two early experiments produced results 
consistent with this conclusion - Gotlib and McCann (1984) and Gotlib and Cane 
(1987) found that depression was associated with greater colour naming 
interference of depression-related words in a nonclinical student sample and in a 
clinical sample, respectively. Similarly, Klieger and Cordner (1990) found an 
emotional Stroop effect for mildly dysphoric students, though they found no 
effect for moderately dysphoric students. However, none of these experimenters 
measured anxiety in their participants. This leaves open the possibility that the 
depressed groups in these experiments were characterised by higher levels of 
anxiety than the control groups, and that it was this greater level of anxiety that 
produced the emotional Stroop effect. Depression, in itself, could have had no 
effect at all. Studies that have examined both anxiety and depression lend support 
to this possibility. Mathews and MacLeod (1985) ran a Stroop task on controls 
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and on outpatients who had been referred by general practitioners for anxiety 
management training. These authors measured state and trait anxiety using the 
STAI, and depression using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). Looking at 
the sample as a whole, STAI-Trait, STAI-State, and BDI scores were all 
significantly correlated with emotional Stroop interference. However, when 
partial correlations were calculated for these variables (in each case, controlling 
for the other two measures used), only state anxiety remained significantly 
related to the interference effect. Thus, it is plausible that the effect of depression 
on Stroop interference was mediated by state anxiety. Dalgleish (1995) chose 12 
high and 12 low anxious students based on their STAI-Trait scores. He 
conducted an emotional Stroop task using button press responses to categorized 
neutral, positive and threat words. As well as calculating group differences, he 
calculated correlations between measures of emotional disturbance and degree of 
threat word interference, although these correlations may have been inflated by 
the highly selected nature of the sample. Threat word interference was most 
highly related to STAI-State score (r = .67) but it was also related to STAI-Trait 
(r = .56) and BDI scores (r = 0.44). Partial correlations for each of the mood 
measures with Stroop interference, controlling for the other mood measures, 
were nonsignificant. Given the small sample size used in this experiment, and the 
likelihood that there were very high intercorrelations between the mood 
measures, this is unsurprising.  
MacLeod and Hagan (1992) ran the emotional Stroop on a nonclinical, 
nonstudent sample, unselected for depression or anxiety, and found that when 
emotional threat words were presented supraliminally, there was no association 
between threat word interference and self-reports of either anxiety or depression. 
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When the threat words were presented subliminally, both the STAI-Trait and 
STAI-State were significantly related to interference. There was a nonsignificant 
trend for the BDI to relate to interference; again, if this trend represents a real 
effect, it may have been caused by the relationship of depression to anxiety. 
Finally, Hill and Knowles (1991) found no effect of subclinical depression on 
emotional Stroop interference. In fairness to the case for an effect of depression 
on the emotional Stroop, it should be noted that their small sample size (24 
participants in all) is likely to have resulted in very low power. However, the 
weight of the evidence from these subclinical studies strongly suggests that 
interference on the emotional Stroop is due to anxiety, not depression. 
Studies of clinically anxious and depressed individuals have tended to 
confirm that Stroop interference is more closely related to anxiety than to 
depression. McNeil, Tucker, Miranda, Lewin, and Nordgren (1999) investigated 
performance on two emotional Stroop tasks, one of which used depression 
related stimuli and the other of which used anxiety related stimuli. Participants 
were clinically diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, or major depressive disorder. Overall, the participants were 
slower when responding to emotional words, but when the groups were analyzed 
individually, this effect was significant only in the post-traumatic stress disorder 
group. There was no evidence that matching type of negative stimuli to 
participant diagnosis produced more interference than nonspecific negative 
stimuli. Carter, Maddock, and Magliozzi (1992) also ran Stroop experiments 
with depression and anxiety related stimuli, this time on controls and on 
participants with either panic disorder or clinical depression. Panic disordered 
participants showed significant interference for both kinds of stimuli, while 
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clinically depressed participants showed a non-significant trend towards showing 
interference for depression-related stimuli only (p = 0.11), despite reporting 
higher levels of trait anxiety than the panic disordered participants. Bradley, 
Mogg, Millar, and White (1995) obtained findings even more inconsistent with 
the idea that depression can produce an emotional Stroop effect – they found that 
participants with an anxiety disorder alone, but not control participants or 
participants with a comorbid anxiety and depression diagnosis, showed an 
interference effect for negative words. That is, the presence of severe depression 
appeared to actively suppress the emotional Stroop effect.   
In summary, some studies have found an association between depression 
and slowed colour naming of emotional words. However, these studies have 
failed to rule out the plausible hypothesis that anxiety mediates this difference. 
Because of the known association between depression and anxiety, no study can 
convincingly demonstrate a potentially causal link between depression and 
emotional Stroop interference unless it also measures the association between 
concurrent anxiety and Stroop interference. No study that has done this has found 
a significant association between current depression and emotional interference 
that could not plausibly be mediated by anxiety. Finally, although many studies 
have found an emotional Stroop effect related to anxiety, the effect has not been 
entirely consistently replicated, even at clinical levels of distress (Dozois & 
Dobson, 2001; Kyrios & Iob, 1998). 
Although the emotional Stroop task has been a very popular research tool, 
several authors have argued that the emotional Stroop effect cannot be 
unambiguously interpreted as demonstrating an attentional bias (Gotlib & 
MacLeod, 1997). In the conventional Stroop task, it is unclear that the 
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interference effect can be strictly attributed to attentional processes (MacLeod, 
1991), and this problem also applies to the emotional Stroop (Williams et al., 
1996). Similarly, De Ruiter and Brosschot (1994) argue that the emotional 
Stroop effect may be due to anxious participants utilising cognitive avoidance, 
rather than selectively attending to the negative information. Tasks examining 
facilitation effects have examined the influence of mood on attention more 
directly. 
The first facilitation task used was the dot-probe task. The dot-probe task 
is a reaction time task, in which dots are presented somewhere on a computer 
screen. The participant responds with a key press as rapidly as possible. Neutral 
or emotional words are presented in different regions of the computer screen. 
Allocation of attention is demonstrated by facilitated reaction time – that is, if 
participants respond more rapidly to dots presented near the negative stimuli, 
then it is assumed that their attention is being allocated to the negative stimuli.  
Reviewers have concluded that anxious participants show consistent 
negative biases in attention on the dot probe task (Gotlib & MacLeod, 1997). 
However, similarly to studies utilising the emotional Stroop, studies using the dot 
probe task have found inconsistent relationships between depression and 
deployment of attention. MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986) found that 
clinically anxious participants showed biases towards negative information, but 
clinically depressed participants did not. However, controls showed a bias away 
from negative information, so the attentional deployment of the clinically 
depressed individuals cannot be considered normal. Similarly, Hill and Dutton 
(1989) found no difference between nonclinically depressed individuals and 
controls on a dot-probe task. Three more recent studies have found a negative 
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attentional bias on the dot probe task for both clinically (Mathews, Ridgeway, & 
Williamson, 1996; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995) and nonclinically 
depressed populations (Westra & Kuiper, 1997). Gotlib and Neubauer (2000) 
suggest that these positive findings are due to a methodological refinement in 
these studies, although it is unclear why this methodological refinement should 
be necessary to find an effect for depression, but not for anxiety. 
A second kind of facilitation task is the Deployment of Attention Task 
(DOAT) developed by Gotlib, McLachlan, and Katz (1988). In the DOAT, 
participants are asked to fixate on a central crosshair, and are then presented with 
two words, one above and one below the crosshair. The words are then replaced 
with coloured bars. The participants are asked to determine which bar appeared 
first; in fact, the bars appear simultaneously. Prior research has demonstrated that 
people perceive events as occurring sooner when they have allocated their 
attention to that spatial area. Therefore, when participants perceive bars that 
replace words of a certain valence as appearing sooner, it is inferred that they are 
preferentially allocating their attention towards this word valence. 
Gotlib et al. (1988) compared the performance of subclinically depressed 
participants on the DOAT to the performance of controls and, unexpectedly, 
found that controls showed a bias away from negative stimuli, but subclinically 
depressed participants did not. Mogg et al. (1991) compared subclinically 
anxious participants and controls, and clinically anxious participants and 
controls, and found no evidence of bias in any group. However, they used a 
shorter stimulus exposure time in these experiments than had been used in Gotlib 
et al.'s earlier experiment (500 ms vs. 730 ms). The same authors then compared 
high and low anxious students, using a median split on STAI-State score and a 
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730 ms presentation time. They found that low-anxious participants were 
positively biased, but high-anxious participants were not. McCabe and Gotlib 
(1995) compared clinically depressed participants to controls and found that 
controls were positively biased but that clinically depressed individuals were not. 
Finally, McCabe and Toman (2000) compared subclinically depressed 
participants to controls and found that controls were positively biased but 
subclinically depressed individuals were not. This pattern of results was found 
regardless of stimulus presentation duration (750 – 1500ms). The authors of this 
series of studies concluded that clinically and subclinically depressed 
participants, and subclinically anxious participants, are even-handed in their 
attention, but that “normal” controls show a positive bias. 
This series of studies is interesting in that each study has sought to 
measure both anxiety and depression using self-report measures. The three most 
recent studies have also measured both state and trait anxiety. However, three of 
the four studies suffer from a methodological problem in differentiating anxiety 
from depression. Gotlib et al. (1988), Mogg et al. (1991), and McCabe and 
Gotlib (1995) used the STAI to measure anxiety, and this instrument 
differentiates anxiety from depression poorly (Bieling, Antony, & Swinson, 
1998; Endler, Cox, Parker, & Bagby, 1992). Perhaps as a result, the studies have 
been inconsistent in their findings as to whether depression or anxiety is more 
closely related to attentional bias - Gotlib et al. (1988) found anxiety and 
depression to be equally important, Mogg et al. (1991) found anxiety to be more 
important than depression, and McCabe and Gotlib (1995) and McCabe and 
Toman (2000) found depression to be more important than anxiety. Experiment 1 
Emotion-Congruent Information Processing  35 
of this thesis addressed this issue by using a measure of anxiety that has been 
found to be relatively separate from depression. 
This series of studies also illustrates a point made in the section on 
studies of clinical and subclinical depression. In each of these studies, the control 
group was significantly lower in self-reported distress than is the general 
population (Beuke, 2002). Thus, the positive biases shown by the control groups 
of these studies may have been present because these groups were unusually 
happy or calm. Experiment 1 of this thesis addresses this issue by using an 
unselected sample. 
In summary, studies of attentional processing have found that interference 
effects are fairly consistently shown by anxious participants, but are less 
consistently shown by depressed participants. Facilitation effects occur 
consistently in anxiety, and also occur consistently in depression on the DOAT 
task, but less consistently on the dot probe task. 
 
Mood and Judgement 
 
Like studies of mood-congruent memory, studies of mood-congruent 
judgement have taken two main approaches: inducing mood in normal 
participants, and investigating participants with naturally elevated anxiety or 
depression. Using the first strategy, Forgas, Bower, and Krantz (1984) 
hypnotically induced participants into happy or unhappy moods, and had them 
rate behaviour shown during an interview videotaped in a previous session. 
Participants rated both their own and another person’s behaviour more negatively 
when induced into the unhappy, rather than happy, mood, and this effect was 
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particularly pronounced for self-ratings. This study was limited by the fact that it 
did not include a neutral condition; so it is possible that the happy participants 
were the ones who showed mood-congruent biases, and that the unhappy 
participants were unbiased. The use of hypnotism may also have created demand 
effects. Johnson and Tversky (1983) found that using a newspaper article 
referring to a tragic event to induce negative mood raised subjective estimates of 
the likelihood of unrelated risks. Schwarz and Clore (1983) asked participants to 
judge their satisfaction with their own lives. They induced positive or negative 
mood either by asking participants to recall a positive or negative event, or by 
interviewing participants on either a sunny or a rainy day. Mood induced by 
either method affected judgement of life satisfaction. The method of using 
natural weather variation to induce mood is particularly impressive, in that the 
resulting effect on judgement seems unlikely to have been caused by non-
emotional associative processes of the kind that could operate in studies using 
Velten inductions, or by demand effects of the kind that could operate in studies 
using hypnotism. 
 Studies of naturally occurring anxiety and depression have also found 
evidence of mood-congruent judgement. Krantz and Hammen (1979) found that 
both clinically depressed participants and participants scoring higher than 
average on the BDI were more likely than controls to select distorted negative 
interpretations of hypothetical events. Kuiper and MacDonald (1983) found that 
estimates of the frequency of positive and negative events in the general 
population, and of the likelihood of depressed or elated responses to those events, 
were congruent with mood as measured with the BDI. In another study, Wenzlaff 
and Bates (1998) asked subclinically depressed or nondepressed participants to 
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unscramble sentences. The participants could unscramble the sentences in either 
a positive or a negative way. Mood-congruent interpretation of the sentences was 
found.  
 Each of these studies has measured or manipulated only one of the three 
relevant components of negative emotion: depression, anxiety, or general 
negative affect. This causes the problem of interpretation discussed in the section 
on anxiety and depression. Because anxiety and depression are closely related, 
and participants selected on one of these variables are also likely to be high on 
the other, none of these studies elucidate whether negative biasing of judgement 
is related to anxiety, depression, or both. One early study that did measure both 
anxiety (using the STAI-Trait) and depression (using the BDI) was conducted by 
Zarantonello, Slaymaker, Johnson, and Petzel (1984). These authors had 
participants perform an anagram unscrambling task. The variable of interest here 
is the participants’ subjective evaluation of their own performance. Both the 
high-depression and the high-anxiety groups gave self-ratings of their own 
performance that were more negative than those of controls, and this effect was 
not solely due to real differences in performance. Subsequent analyses suggested 
that the relationship between depression and subjective rating of performance 
was mediated by anxiety; that is, depression itself had no direct effect on self-
evaluation. This finding suggests that anxiety may be a more important influence 
on judgement tasks than depression, but the evidence for this conclusion is 
weakened by the use in this study of the STAI-T, which as discussed elsewhere 
does not discriminate well between depression and anxiety. 
All of these studies used procedures that clearly made their participants 
aware that they were being given a choice between making either a negative or a 
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positive response. This means that the results of these studies could plausibly be 
explained in terms of demand effects (MacLeod, 1990), especially in those 
studies where the selection process or mood induction procedure is clear to the 
participants. Eysenck, MacLeod, and Mathews (1987) conducted the first 
experiment using a now popular methodology that evaluates how participants 
interpret ambiguous information when it is not made clear that disambiguation is 
the focus of study. This methodology is the homophone interpretation task, and 
in it participants are aurally presented with a word list, and asked to write the 
words down. The task is usually falsely presented to the participants as being a 
word comprehension or spelling task. Some of the words presented are neutral 
and unambiguous, or neutral/neutral homophones, but some are negative/neutral 
or positive/neutral homophones, for example “bored/board” or 
“presents/presence”. It is assumed that the participants record the words in the 
way that they naturally interpret them. Mood-congruent results on this task have 
been found for anxiety as measured using the STAI (Byrne & Eysenck, 1993; 
Eysenck et al., 1987; Mogg et al., 1994), in clinical anxiety states (Mathews, 
Richards, & Eysenck, 1989), in subclinical depression (Wenzlaff & Eisenberg, 
2001), and in induced and naturally occurring negative affective states 
(Halberstadt, Niedenthal, & Kushner, 1995; Rusting, 1999). None of these 
studies have shown whether depression, anxiety, or both are responsible for the 
negative interpretative bias shown in these studies, because none of these studies 
has attempted to directly compare these variables. Experiment 2 of this thesis 
included such a direct comparison. 
Somewhat ironically, all of the studies that have just been described have 
possessed an interpretative ambiguity in their implications, as well as in their 
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stimuli. MacLeod and Mathews (1991) argue that the results found in these 
studies could arise from either of two phenomena. First, anxious and depressed 
individuals could be showing a genuine negative interpretative bias. Second, 
anxious and depressed individuals could be identical to controls in their 
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli, but be more likely than controls to emit 
negative responses. The latter possibility would mean that the results of the 
studies reviewed were due to a response bias rather than to an interpretative bias. 
MacLeod (1990) investigated this possibility. In this study, participants were 
selected for either high or low trait anxiety. In the experimental session, 
participants read aloud sentences, and then read aloud a target word as quickly as 
they could. Target words were either semantically related to the sentence 
presented (primed condition), or semantically unrelated to the sentence presented 
(unprimed condition). Under normal circumstances, primed target words are read 
more quickly than unprimed target words. The critical condition occurred when 
sentences that could be interpreted in either a neutral or negative way were 
presented. These critical sentences were followed by target words related either 
to the neutral or to the negative interpretation of the sentence. The participants' 
interpretations of the ambiguous sentences were inferred by their pattern of 
priming - if the neutral words showed greater priming, it was inferred that the 
participants were making neutral interpretations, but if the negative words 
showed greater priming, it was inferred that the participants were making 
negative interpretations. MacLeod (1990) found that high trait-anxious 
participants who were also high in state anxiety showed greater priming for the 
negative words than did the other participants, suggesting that they made more 
negative interpretations of the ambiguous sentences. This result suggests that this 
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subgroup of anxious individuals genuinely interpret ambiguous stimuli more 
negatively, rather than solely showing a negative response bias. 
Lawson and MacLeod (1998) conducted a similar study, this time 
examining depression. After a large pre-test session, they selected participants 
who were in the top or bottom third of BDI scores, but in the middle third of 
STAI-Trait scores. The study found that for the low BDI group, reaction time to 
words related to the negative meaning of the sentence was facilitated, but 
reaction time to words related to the neutral meaning of the sentence was not. In 
contrast, for the high BDI group, reaction times to words related to the neutral 
meaning of the sentences were facilitated, but reaction time to target words 
related to the negative meanings of the sentences were not. This finding suggests 
low BDI participants were more negatively biased than the high BDI participants 
were - exactly the opposite finding to that predicted. The authors expressed some 
surprise before accepting their results. 
If, however, one assumes that an interpretive bias is due to anxiety and 
not to depression, then the findings of Lawson and MacLeod's study can be 
explained with reference to specific design features of the study and to the 
tripartite model of negative emotion (Clark & Watson, 1991b). Recall that the 
high and low BDI groups of this study were matched on STAI-Trait score, a 
manipulation that required inviting a particularly select group of participants to 
take part in the study. The tripartite model of negative emotion postulates that 
STAI-Trait scores and BDI scores share a common factor, negative affectivity, 
and Bieling et al. (1998) found that the STAI-Trait also contains a depression 
factor, also in common with the BDI. The components of these self-report 
inventories can be expressed as:  
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STAI score = General negative affectivity + Depression factor + Anxiety 
factor 
BDI score = General negative affectivity + Depression factor 
 
It is apparent that on average individuals with high BDI scores will also 
have high STAI scores, and individuals with low BDI scores will also have low 
STAI scores. How could two groups with equal STAI scores, but high and low 
BDI scores, be generated? Assuming the equations above, the only mathematical 
possibility is this: 
 
Low BDI group: Medium STAI score = Low depression and general 
negative affect + high anxiety. 
High BDI group: Medium STAI score = High depression and general 
negative affect + low anxiety. 
 
Thus, paradoxically, by selecting two groups that score equally on an 
anxiety inventory, Lawson and MacLeod (1999) have selected two groups that 
differ in level of pure anxiety. It is possible that a design similar to that used in 
their study would produce an identical set of seemingly puzzling results in a 
more traditional test of interpretative bias, such as the homophone interpretation 
task. Therefore, there is no need to conclude that the differences between the 
findings of their study and the findings of homophone interpretation studies are 
due to the presence of response biases in earlier studies and their absence in 
Lawson and MacLeod's (1999) study; rather, these unusual findings are 
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explicable solely in terms of methodology. According to this view, anxiety 
causes negative interpretative bias, but pure depression does not affect 
interpretative bias either way. The view predicts that clinically depressed 
individuals, being high in anxiety, will show a strong negative interpretative bias. 
The implications of this view are in strong contrast to the conclusions of the 
authors of this study, who call on clinicians and researchers to consider the 
possibility that depressed people are not negatively biased in their interpretation 
of the world at all, but instead show a strong negative response bias. 
In summary, research on depression and anxiety has found that these 
emotions are related to negative interpretative biases. There is evidence that for 
anxiety at least, this interpretative bias cannot be solely attributed to response 
bias. There has been little research contrasting the effects of anxiety and 
depression, but the two studies reviewed that did perform this contrast found that, 
of the two emotional states, anxiety seems to be the more closely related to 
interpretative bias.  
  
Theories of Information Processing in Anxiety and Depression
 
 As discussed earlier, research on information processing in anxiety and 
depression was originally inspired by Beck’s cognitive model of depression, and 
much research in this area continues to be conducted with the explicit goal of 
testing aspects of this theory. It is therefore appropriate to consider the 
theoretical mechanism that Beck’s theory postulates to explain negative 
information processing biases. The most relevant component of Beck’s theory is 
the idea of a schema (Gotlib & MacLeod, 1997). A schema is a hypothetical 
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cognitive structure that organises information about a topic. Schemas can be held 
about many aspects of the world, and it is postulated that they affect attention, 
judgement, and memory. For example, you could have a dishwashing schema 
that serves to direct your attention to the dishwashing detergent bottle, and to 
judge that the yellow liquid within is detergent and not mustard. Later when you 
are at the supermarket trying to remember what you ran out of when you were 
doing the dishes, your dishwashing schema would help remind you that you 
finished all the detergent. Some schemas, like that of a dishwashing schema, are 
held by most people. Other schemas may be highly developed in some people, 
but may be less developed or absent in others. For example, expert chess players, 
novice chess players, and people who have never played chess will have different 
schemas regarding the pattern of pieces on a chess board. These different 
schemas affect the way that people with differing levels of experience remember 
chess games (Gilhooly & Green, 1988). Similarly, Beck et al. (1979) 
hypothesised that anxious and depressed individuals hold schemas that serve to 
enhance processing of either loss or threat information. They speculated that 
these negative schemas may be formed in childhood, and also suggested that they 
are only activated under certain circumstances. Importantly, schema theory 
suggests that anxiety and depression influence cognition in essentially the same 
way – through the activation of relevant schemas. This implies that although 
schema content may differ between anxious and depressed people, both groups 
will show negative biases in attention, judgement, and memory (Williams et al., 
1988). 
 Another highly influential theory is the network theory put forward by 
Bower (1981). Network theory suggests that representations can be thought of as 
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nodes within a network. Connections between nodes (representations) can be 
strong or weak, and concurrent activation of nodes tends to strengthen the 
connections between them. The activation of one node in the network tends to 
spread to other, strongly connected nodes, with the result that they are more 
easily activated by subsequent stimuli. Bower also postulated “depressed mood” 
and “anxious mood” nodes within the network. Because activation of depressed 
mood is likely to frequently co-occur with activation of representations of loss, 
strong associations between depression and representations of loss are likely to 
form. Thus, activation of depressed mood would tend to activate representations 
of loss. This means that external loss related material would be more likely to be 
initially activated (attended to) and subsequently reactivated (remembered) when 
the depression node was active. Similarly, activation of the depression node 
would make it easier for ambiguous material to activate loss-related 
representations. Bower postulated a similar relationship between the anxiety 
node and representations of threat related material. Because anxiety and 
depression nodes are thought to influence cognitive processes through essentially 
the same mechanism, the theory predicts that depression and anxiety may have 
content-specific effects, but will both bias attention, memory, and judgement 
(Bower, 1981). Thus Beck’s schema and Bower’s network theories are very 
similar in their predictions, and could be thought of as different ways of 
expressing the same basic idea. In fact, they may be compatible enough to be 
integrated into a single theoretical framework; Horowitz et al. (1997) have put 
forward a theory that conceives of a schema as a strongly associated network of 
representations. 
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 Although plausible, schema and network theories of information 
processing biases suffer from a problem that was first pointed out by Williams et 
al. (1988). As already discussed, both schema and network theories predict that 
anxiety and depression should both produce negative processing biases across the 
three domains of attention, memory, and judgement. As was already apparent at 
the time of the literature review conducted by Williams et al. (1988), anxiety and 
depression seem to have different effects on these domains. The major reviews 
conducted by MacLeod and Rutherford (1998), Williams et al. (1988), and 
Williams et al. (1997) have all found that depression seems to be more 
consistently associated with biases in explicit memory, and anxiety seems to be 
more consistently associated with biases in implicit memory and attention. 
Williams et al. (1997) also speculated that biases in judgement might be more 
closely related to anxiety than to depression, and the current review found some 
preliminary evidence for this proposition. The differing information processing 
correlates of anxiety and depression led Williams et al. (1988) to propose a 
revised theory of information processing biases. They referred to earlier 
experimental work on memory that distinguished between two distinct processes 
– priming and elaboration. Priming is the strengthening of connections within a 
representation, and makes that representation more easily activated. Elaboration 
is the strengthening of connections between representations, and this process 
makes the target representation easier to retrieve deliberately. Priming is the 
principal mechanism of perceptual implicit memory and the disambiguation of 
stimuli, and it also affects attentional processes. Elaboration is the principal 
mechanism of explicit memory. Williams et al. (1988) postulated that anxiety 
predominately biases priming, and depression predominately biases elaboration. 
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This means that anxiety will affect processes that are based on priming, such as 
attention and perceptual implicit memory. It also means that depression will 
affect processes that are based on elaboration, such as explicit and 
autobiographical memory. 
Williams et al.'s (1988) theory neatly explained the data that existed at 
that time. Williams et al. (1997) conducted a major narrative review of the 
literature subsequent to their earlier book, partially with the intention of 
evaluating their earlier theory. Their review was broadly supportive of their 
general model, but also found some evidence inconsistent with their model. 
Williams et al. (1997) discussed possible reasons for this, and proposed some 
extensions to their theory. In particular, they suggest that in addition to the 
distinction between priming and elaboration, there is an additional distinction 
between memory-related and non-memory-related processes. They also 
elaborated on how their model could be accommodated within two broader 
theories of memory, emotion, and cognitive processing: the multiple-entry 
memory system (MEM; Johnson & Multhaup, 1992) and the theory of 
interacting cognitive subsystems (ICS; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). With the 
possible exception of the findings of studies using the DOAT task to measure 
attention in depression, the recent experimental literature as reviewed in this 
thesis remains consistent with the revised model put forward by Williams et al. 
(1997). However, as acknowledged by these authors, both their own theory and 
the theories of Johnson and Multhaup (1992) and Teasdale and Barnard (1993) 
remain reasonably broad in their predictions. The refinement of these models is 
dependent on further research on cognition and emotion, and one particularly 
promising path is further specification of the distinctions between cognitive 
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processes in different emotions (Williams et al., 1997). This thesis contributes to 
this development by contrasting the cognitive processes in the related emotions 
of anxiety and depression. 
 
Somatic and Cognitive Aspects of Depression and Cognitive Biases 
 
It is common for cognitively oriented researchers to attempt to explain 
cognitive biases in depression without reference to biological mediation. For 
example, in Bower's (1981) model, mood-congruent memory in depressed 
individuals is explained by stronger connections between nodes that code for 
negative information. Pure-cognitive models of depression and information 
processing predict that negatively biased information processing will be most 
strongly associated with those items on depression inventories that measure 
depressed thoughts and beliefs, rather than those measuring somatic symptoms. 
Horowitz et al. (1997), who propose a pure-cognitive model of depression, 
explicitly argue that information processing biases are tied to psychological 
rather than biological variables, and suggest that information processing biases 
will be altered more by psychological treatments than by pharmacological 
treatments. 
 Close consideration of pure-cognitive models of mood-congruent 
information processing in depression reveals that they are inconsistent with some 
of the evidence on cognition and emotion. Most tellingly, Kumari et al. (1998) 
investigated the effects of placebo and of the mood-lowering drug haloperidol on 
recall of autobiographical memories. They found that the drug caused 
participants to recall unhappier memories, and that the change in valence of 
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recalled events was only partially mediated by self-rated mood. This study 
suggests that negative biases in recall are strongly biologically mediated. Also 
consistent with this conclusion is the study of Clark and Teasdale (1982), who 
investigated valence of autobiographical events recalled at different times of the 
day. The participants were depressed individuals with strong diurnal variation in 
mood, and this variation is widely believed to be biological in nature (Shelton, 
Hollon, Purdon, & Loosen, 1991). Valence of recalled events varied with time of 
day in a manner that was congruent with current mood. Deldin, Keller, Gergen, 
and Miller (2001) have found that differences in information processing between 
depressed and nondepressed individuals are detectable using event-related brain 
potentials. The fact that differences in processing are detectable using gross 
neuropsychological measurements is more consistent with biological 
involvement than with pure-cognitive theories. As noted earlier, the theories of 
Williams et al. (1997) and Teasdale and Barnard (1993) are amongst the most 
successful in explaining the current experimental literature on cognition in 
emotion. Both of these theories - especially the ICS theory (Teasdale, 1999) – 
argue that the cognitive mechanisms they postulate will ultimately be explicable 
in neurobiological terms. Rolls and Treves (1998) take the first steps in 
formulating such an explanation by suggesting specific neural pathways that 
could mediate mood-congruent processing. These proposed biologically 
mediated models of selective information processing are consistent with 
proposals that information processing in anxiety and depression serves an 
evolutionarily designed purpose (Mathews, 1990). Models that suggest 
neurobiological mediation of the relationship between emotion and cognitive 
processes predict that information processing biases will be more closely 
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associated with the somatic symptoms of depression than with the cognitive 
symptoms. The current studies investigate the relative influence of somatic and 
cognitive symptoms of depression in order to determine whether mood-
congruent information processing is biologically mediated. 
 
Using Information Processing Biases to Measure Depression 
 
As well as the theoretical reasons for investigating information 
processing biases, there has been some speculation that their measurement might 
be of practical use. Horowitz et al. (1997) proposed that a participant’s mean 
negative bias score across a battery of information processing tasks could be used 
to assess their level of depression. In theory, an information processing battery 
would eliminate the effect of conscious response strategies on the measurement 
of depression, and this would have a variety of practical benefits (Horowitz et al., 
1997). For example, results on a well-designed information processing battery 
would be free of demand effects, making it a more accurate index of 
improvement with treatment. Similarly, the battery could be used to compare 
males with females, without the potentially contaminating influence of different 
degrees of self-disclosure. Because testing the main hypotheses of this thesis 
involved implementing batteries of information processing tasks, many of which 
are thought to relate to some degree to depression, the project was able to test the 
practicality of the idea of an information processing measure of depression. 
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Hemispheric Thinking Style and Information Processing
 
This introduction has discussed the influences of depression and anxiety 
on information processing. Another variable that may influence information 
processing is hemispheric thinking style. The idea that people may show thinking 
styles related to hemispheric dominance arose from evidence that the two 
hemispheres of the brain show some specialisation of function (Iaccino, 1993). 
This evidence for functional differences was exaggerated and distorted by the 
popular press, as was the idea that some people might rely more heavily on one 
hemisphere than on the other (Corballis, 1999). However, despite the plethora of 
misleading information, recent evidence is consistent with the idea that there are 
some functional differences between the left and right hemispheres (Iaccino, 
1993). Further, there is evidence for stable individual differences in patterns of 
activation of the left and right hemispheres, and these differences correlate with 
answers to a paper and pencil thinking style questionnaire (Merckelbach, Muris, 
Pool, & De Jong, 1996). This suggests that people do show different thinking 
styles, and that these thinking styles are influenced by differences in brain 
function. 
This thesis examines two aspects of the influence of thinking style on 
information processing. First, Merckelbach, Muris, and Horselenberg (1996) 
examined the effect of thinking style on ability to produce specific memories. 
Their investigation was based on Iaccino's (1993) argument that the left 
hemisphere is specialised for analytic and verbal thinking, and the right 
hemisphere for holistic and nonverbal thinking. They predicted that people with a 
right-hemispheric dominant thinking style would pay less attention to detail and 
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would thus be more likely to produce overgeneral memories (Merckelbach, 
Muris, & Horselenberg, 1996). They obtained results opposed to their prediction: 
right-hemispheric thinking style was linked to the production of fewer, rather 
than more, overgeneral memories. The theory behind their prediction is also of 
uncertain validity, in that the hypothesis of hemispheric specialisation for 
analytic and holistic thinking has not received clear empirical support (Coren, 
1992). Nonetheless, because some authors have suggested that overgeneral recall 
may predispose people to depression (Williams, 1992), potential influences on 
memory specificity are of relevance to research into depression. Experiment 2 
includes a partial replication of Merckelbach, Muris, and Horselenberg's (1996) 
investigation; more detail on this matter is included in the discussion of 
Experiment 1. 
Second, there is evidence that the right-hemisphere is specialised for the 
processing of emotion-related information (Borod, Bloom, Brickman, Nakhutina, 
& Curko, 2002; Mandal, Asthana, Pandey, & Sarbadhikari, 1996). Thus, 
individuals with a right-hemispheric dominant thinking style might be more 
likely to interpret ambiguous information in an emotional way. Experiment 2 
tested this hypothesis. 
 
The Purpose of the Current Investigation 
 
This review discussed the historical context of the study of anxiety, 
depression, and information processing bias. Then three methodological issues 
were discussed – anxiety and depression as uncontrolled confounds of each 
other, clinical versus nonclinical samples, and statistical power. The literature 
relating to emotion and information processing was reviewed, highlighting 
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examples of these methodological problems and established differences between 
the information processing correlates of anxiety and depression. The main 
theories that seek to explain information processing biases in depression and 
anxiety were reviewed, and the importance to theory of differences in the 
information processing correlates of anxiety and depression was highlighted. In 
essence, Beck’s schema theory, Bower’s network theory, and these theories’ 
derivatives predict that anxiety and depression will both be characterised by 
pervasive negative biases. In contrast, Williams et al.'s (1988, 1997) theory 
predicts that anxiety will have a greater influence on tasks involving priming, 
and depression will have a greater influence on tasks involving elaboration. 
Finally, the explicit or implicit assumption of cognitive theorists that cognitive 
biases are the product of purely cognitive rather than biologically based 
processes is contrasted with existing empirical evidence and opposing theoretical 
viewpoints. 
 The current studies examine the two issues discussed in the final sections 
on theory, with reference to the methodological issues also discussed. The two 
major aims were: 
 
1. To test the hypothesis of Williams et al. (1988, 1997) that anxiety is 
associated with cognitive biases in tasks requiring priming, and 
depression is associated with cognitive biases in tasks requiring 
elaboration.  
2. To test the hypothesis, derived from the current literature review, that 
cognitive biases in depression are more closely related to the somatic 
than to the cognitive aspects of depression. Usefully, the Beck 
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Depression Inventory – II possesses separate cognitive-affective and 
somatic factors (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998), and the 
experiments described investigate which of these factors is more 
closely associated with information processing biases. 
 
A variety of studies have already been conducted that are relevant to Aim 
1, but they were not explicitly designed to address this issue. Williams et al. 
(1988, 1997) acknowledge that in the existing research literature, between-
experiment methodological differences are an important limiting factor on the 
precision with which comparisons of the effects of anxiety and depression can be 
made. The current research is a direct test of Williams et al.'s (1988, 1997) 
hypothesis, and thus it has several methodological advantages. First, the 
experiment consistently measured both anxiety and depression, using scales that 
clearly discriminate between the two emotions. This meant that their effects 
could be directly compared, holding experimental methodology constant. It also 
allowed partial correlations to be conducted, allowing  the experimenter to 
examine whether either depression or anxiety has an effect that is independent of 
the other emotion. Second, tasks reliant on both priming-dependent and 
elaboration-dependent processes were included within each experiment, allowing 
the two types of processes to be directly compared.  
 It is also worth summarising the subsidiary aims of the project, discussed 
in detail in the earlier literature review: 
 
1. Experiment 1 examined whether positive biases on the deployment of 
attention task were shown by the majority of the population, or 
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whether these biases were shown only by those who were unusually 
low in depression and anxiety. 
2. Experiment 2 examined several influences on the specificity of  
autobiographical memory. 
3. Experiment 2 also examined the effect of left- and right- hemispheric 
thinking style on the interpretation of emotional material.  
4. The project examined the viability of using information processing 
tasks to assess level of depression. 
 
Hypotheses of Experiment 1 
 
 Experiment 1 contained two elaboration-dependent and three priming-
dependent tasks adapted from the existing cognitive experimental literature. 
Tasks were chosen based on degree of existing empirical support, and on the 
basis that their mood-related nature would not be apparent to the participants, so 
that the results would be free from demand effects. The elaboration-dependent 
tasks were an explicit memory task and a conceptual implicit memory task, the 
latter based closely on Watkins et al. (1996). It was hypothesised that bias on 
these tasks would be directly associated with depression, but not directly 
associated with anxiety. The priming-dependent tasks were a perceptual implicit 
memory task, a test of emotion-related attentional interference (the emotional 
Stroop), and a test of emotion-related attentional facilitation (the DOAT). It was 
hypothesised that bias on these tasks would be directly associated with anxiety, 
but not directly associated with depression. Finally, the subliminal priming task 
implemented by Bradley et al. (1994) was also included, but post-experimental 
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checks showed that the priming part of this task was not implemented with the 
necessary methodological fidelity, and so this task will not be further discussed 
here. 
 Thus, the hypotheses of Experiment 1 were: 
 Relevant to Aim 1
1. Negative bias scores derived from the explicit memory task would 
correlate positively with depression scores, but less strongly with anxiety scores. 
2. Negative bias scores derived from the conceptual implicit memory task 
would correlate positively with depression scores but less strongly with anxiety 
scores. 
3. Negative bias scores derived from the perceptual implicit memory task 
would correlate positively with anxiety scores, but less strongly with depression 
scores. 
4. The interference scores derived from the emotional Stroop task would 
correlate positively with anxiety scores, but less strongly with depression scores. 
5. The negative bias scores derived from the DOAT would correlate 
positively with anxiety scores, but less strongly with depression scores. 
Relevant to Aim 2
6. When negative bias scores correlated significantly with depression 
scores, they would correlate more strongly with the somatic factor of the 
inventory used than with the cognitive-affective factor. 
Relevant to Subsidiary Aim 1 
7. Consistent with the assumptions of Gotlib et al. (1988) and subsequent 
authors, those participants in the lower three quartiles of anxiety and depression 
would show a positive bias on the deployment of attention task; only those 
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participants scoring in the highest quartile of these measures would show 
unbiased attention. 
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Experiment 1 
 
Method 
 
Overview 
 
Undergraduate students completed six computer-administered tasks 
designed to measure mood-congruent bias. Three of these tasks examined 
memory: a perceptual implicit memory test (word-stem completion), a 
conceptual implicit memory test (free association), and an intentional recall task. 
These tasks compared responses to negative and positive stimuli, and the 
dependent variables were the number of positive and negative words recalled. 
The other three tasks compared responses to negative and neutral stimuli. One 
task was the emotional Stroop, for which the dependent variable was the amount 
of emotional Stroop interference. Another was a primed lexical decision task, for 
which the dependent variables were the magnitudes of the priming that occurred 
for negative and neutral words. The final task was the deployment of attention 
task (DOAT), for which the dependent variable was the proportion of trials in 
which the participant said that the coloured bar that replaced the negatively 
valenced word appeared first. Following the experimental tasks, the participants 
completed self-report measures of depression and anxiety. 
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Participants 
 
 Participants were 203 Victoria University of Wellington students, 
recruited using notices placed around campus. They received a small monetary 
reward to compensate them for their time. Supplying demographic data was 
optional, but of those who answered, 92 were female and 109 were male. The 
median age of the participants was 21 years. There were 154 New Zealand 
European participants, 11 New Zealand Maori, and 32 of other ethnicity. There 
were 42 participants who had taken a university psychology paper at some stage, 
and 161 who had not. Potential participants were excluded from the experiment 
if they had started or completed a third year of study in psychology or if English 
was not their first language. 
 
Materials 
 
 Depression and anxiety were measured with the Beck Depression Inventory 
– II (BDI-II; Beck, 1996) and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HAD; 
Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). The original Beck Depression Inventory has excellent 
psychometric properties and is widely recommended (Basco, Krebaum, & Rush, 
1997), and there is evidence that this inventory has been further improved in the 
second edition (Beck, 1996). The HAD also shows good psychometric 
properties, and has been widely used (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Neckelmann, 
2002; Herrmann, 1997). Several studies have shown that the HAD adequately 
differentiates anxiety and depression (Bjelland et al., 2002). Although the HAD 
was developed in a hospital setting, it is often used in other settings (for example, 
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Bradley et al., 1996), and the authors of the scale endorse this use (Snaith, 1992). 
Consistent with convention, both subscales of the HAD were administered. 
However, to prevent unnecessary duplication, only the anxiety subscale (the 
HAD-A) was included in the analyses. 
 
Apparatus 
 
 The experimental computer program was custom designed in Visual Basic, 
and is available on request. The program was run on Pentium III computers with 
standard colour CRT monitors, under Windows 98. 
 
Procedure 
 
The introduction to the study and the encoding and retrieval stages of the 
implicit memory tests were conducted before the other tasks, in the order 
presented below. The remaining four tasks were presented in randomised order. 
It was not possible to counterbalance the implicit memory tasks, because this 
would have allowed the possibility of the word stimuli used in the other 
experimental tasks contaminating performance in the implicit memory tasks.  
 After the participants had finished the computerised tasks, the computer 
administered the HAD, and the experimenter administered the BDI-II. 
 Introduction to the study. The participants were told that the general aim of 
the research was to look at the relationship between performance on different 
tests of attention and memory and recent experiences and feelings, and that the 
precise objectives of the experiment would be explained after the experiment. 
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They then gave their informed consent. No further explanation of the purposes of 
the tasks was given during the experiment. 
 Participants were tested in groups of one to twelve individuals. Participants 
were seated in front of their own computer. The room was laid out such that 
individual responses were not easily visible to other participants. Participants 
were instructed by the experimenter to fill out a questionnaire asking for basic 
demographic data, to wear the headphones supplied, to follow the instructions 
given by the computer with great care, and to ask the experimenter for help 
immediately if they should become confused by any aspect of the procedure. The 
experimenter was available and in the room throughout the duration of the 
experiment. Instructions on the individual tasks were displayed on the computer 
screen. Binary or Likert scale choices were made using the computer keyboard, 
and whole word responses were made in a booklet supplied by the experimenter. 
 The perceptual and conceptual implicit memory tests. In outline, participants 
were asked to elaboratively encode a list of positive and negative words, and then 
their implicit memory for these words was tested with word stem completion and 
word association tasks. 
 The procedures for these tasks were based on the perceptual and conceptual 
implicit memory tasks used by Ruiz-Caballero and Gonzalez (1994), and 
Watkins, Vache, Verney, and Mathews (1996), respectively. 
 Encoding task. Word stimuli for the task were identical to those shown in 
Watkins et al. (1996), except that the neutral words were omitted. The word 
stimuli were divided into two non-overlapping sets, each with 8 negative and 8 
positive words. The computer program randomly assigned participants to word 
set. The assigned word set was the studied word condition, and the non-assigned 
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word set was the unstudied word condition. After a two second display of the 
prompt “Imagination task now begins”, the assigned word set was displayed. 
Each word was presented individually for 15 seconds. Participants were asked to 
imagine themselves in a scene involving each word for the duration of the word 
presentation. Participants were then asked to answer the following questions 
about the scene imagined: 
 1. Was the scene an actual scene from your past or an imaginary scene? 
 2. Were you the principal character of the scene? 
 3. Rate the vividness of the scene from 1 to 9 by pressing the corresponding 
key  
 4. Rate the pleasantness of the scene from 1 to 9 by pressing the 
corresponding key 
 The next word was then presented. No practice trials were given. Following 
the imagination task, participants completed a brief distracter task. Participants 
were presented with arrays of lower case letters and asked to quickly decide 
whether there was an m in each array. The computer program was set up to 
continue presenting trials for thirty seconds. 
 Perceptual implicit retrieval task. Participants were told to turn to the page 
in their experimental booklet which listed the first three letters of each of the 
words from the studied and unstudied word sets, for a total of 32 word stems, 
presented in alphabetical order. They were told to complete each word stem with 
the first word that came to mind, to complete the task as quickly as possible, and 
that they were being timed. 
 Conceptual implicit retrieval task. Participants were told that they were to 
take part in a free association task, and that they were to produce as many words 
Emotion-Congruent Information Processing  62 
as possible in response to some cue words. The computer presented them with 
cue words corresponding to each of the words from the studied and unstudied 
word sets, for a total of 32 cue words. The cue words were taken from Watkins et 
al. (1996). In contrast to Watkins et al. (1996), who recorded responses on a tape 
recorder, responses were written into the supplied booklet. Participants were 
given 20 seconds to respond to each cue word, followed by a tone and the 
immediate onset of the next cue word. Positive and negative cues were 
alternated. 
 The remaining four tasks were presented in randomised order. 
 The intentional recall task. Participants were told that they would be given 
four minutes to learn a word list, and that they would be asked to recall the words 
later in the experiment. They were then presented with 20 words (10 negative 
and 10 positive). The negative words have been normed and used in previous 
experiments on cognition and emotion (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Watkins et 
al., 1996). The positive words were derived by selecting negative words that 
were used by these sources, but that were not used for the current task, and 
determining their antonyms using a thesaurus (Urdang, 1997). The words were 
presented concurrently, positioned in individually randomised order. Following 
the learning procedure, the participants performed the m-search distracter task 
for three minutes, and then recalled as many words as they could within a three 
minute time limit. Responses were written into the supplied booklet. 
 The emotional Stroop task. Participants were told that they would be 
presented with some words, and that their task was to identify the colour that 
each word was presented in. The words could be presented in red, yellow, green, 
or blue. Participants identified the colour that each word was presented in using 
Emotion-Congruent Information Processing  63 
corresponding keys from the computer keyboard. Participants were first given 10 
neutral word practice trials. Then, in the main task, 50 depression-related and 50 
neutral words were presented. The depression-related words were from the same 
pool as used in the intentional recall task, but did not overlap with them. The 
neutral words were from Jenkins, Russell, and Suci (1958), Mathews, Mogg, 
May, and Eysenck (1989) and Watkins et al. (1996). Feedback on correctness 
was given after each trial. The computer recorded the number of words of each 
stimulus type correct, and reaction times for both correct and incorrect responses. 
 The primed lexical decision task. Participants were told that they would be 
presented with some strings of letters, and that they were to determine whether or 
not the letter strings formed valid words. Participants responded using the 
computer keyboard. Stimuli were the set of 50 depression-related and 50 neutral 
words from the Stroop task, and 100 pronounceable nonwords. Unfortunately, 
due to technical problems with the subliminal priming of the stimuli, the data 
from this task had to be discarded. 
 The deployment of attention (DOAT) task. Participants were told that in 
each trial, they were to fixate on a crosshair while being presented with two 
coloured bars, and that their task was to determine whether the green or the red 
bar appeared on the screen first. In fact, in every trial both bars appeared 
simultaneously. The bars were 16 cm apart for the first 101 participants, and 8 
cm apart for the remaining 103 participants; thus only the latter set of 
participants viewed the stimuli within foveal vision. Each coloured bar replaced a 
word stimulus. In previous research, judging that a bar appeared first is taken to 
be an indication of attention to that word (McCabe & Gotlib, 1995). Participants 
first completed six practice trials, in which both bars replaced neutral words, then 
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fifty data collection trials, in which one bar replaced a neutral word and one bar 
replaced a negative word. The word stimuli used in the main task were identical 
to those used in the Stroop. 
 Administration of the mood questionnaires. After the participants had 
finished all of the experimental tasks, the computer prompted them to complete 
two final questionnaires. The first, the HAD, was administered by the computer. 
The computer then prompted the participant to ask for the BDI-II, which for 
copyright reasons was administered in written form. Participants were given the 
option of not answering some or all questionnaire items. Participants were then 
debriefed, and asked not to talk to other students about the purpose of the 
experiment. 
 
Results 
 
 The experimenter was blind to responses to the emotion measures while 
scoring task responses, and while making decisions about excluding participants 
from analyses. Exclusion criteria were determined before the data were analysed. 
All t-tests for planned comparisons are one-tailed unless otherwise specified. 
This decision was made before the analyses were conducted. Since its inception, 
the use of directional statistical tests has had both advocates and detractors (for 
reviews, see Hsu, 2000; Leventhal, 1999; Lipsey, 1998; Overall, 1990). In this 
experiment, one-tailed tests were used because the comparisons conducted were 
direct replications of existing studies, and because lack of statistical power is a 
significant methodological problem in this area. The main hypotheses under 
investigation were whether mood-congruent effects, the existence of which has 
Emotion-Congruent Information Processing  65 
already been accepted in the literature, are associated with anxiety or with 
depression, and with cognitive or biological symptoms. Exact probabilities are 
also reported and can be used to calculate two-tailed probabilities if desired. All 
power calculations were conducted using the GPOWER computer program 
(Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996). 
 
Exclusions for Poor Data Quality. 
 
 Tests involving HAD scores. Four participants opted not to save their 
HAD results. All participants chose to complete the BDI-II. 
 Tests involving Stroop scores. Participants were excluded if their 
combined error score across both conditions was classified as an outlier by box 
plot analysis (more than 9 errors out of a total of 100 trials; seven participants 
were excluded). 
Tests involving attention deployment scores. Due to technical problems 
with the administration of this task (the stimuli were placed too far apart for the 
words to be readable), the results for the first 101 participants are not presented. 
Participants were also excluded if the proportion of times they chose the top 
stimuli exceeded 90% or did not reach 10% (indicating they spent most of their 
time pressing only one key). This resulted in the exclusion of seven participants. 
A box-plot analysis was also conducted on the mean of the participants’ median 
reaction times for the two word valences, but no low outliers were found. One 
participant was excluded for having a mean of median reaction times of less than 
the arbitrary but pre-determined cut-off of 250ms. These exclusion criteria meant 
that 93 participants were included in the analysis of this task. 
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Tests involving implicit memory scores. Participants were excluded for 
not correctly completing the m-search task that immediately preceded the 
relevant implicit memory task. In practice, this meant calculating an m-search 
score for each participant, by subtracting number of incorrect answers from 
number of correct answers. If a participant’s m-search score was classified as a 
low outlier, that participant was excluded. Nine participants were excluded from 
the word-stem completion task (for scoring below 15) and six participants were 
excluded from the word association task (for scoring below 20). 
Tests involving explicit memory scores. The same procedure was 
followed as for the implicit memory tasks. Five participants were excluded for 
scoring less than 57. 
 Lexical decision task. Due to technical problems with the priming of the 
stimuli, the results of this task are not presented. 
 Exclusion from all analyses. Participants who met exclusion criteria for 
three or more task analyses may have been uncooperative. Three participants 
were excluded from all analyses for this reason. 
 
Depression and Anxiety Measures 
 
 The mean BDI-II score was 10.27 (SD = 7.13), which is similar to that 
found in the normative sample reported in the inventory’s manual (Beck, 1996). 
The mean HAD-A score was 8.54 (SD = 3.44), which is somewhat higher than 
the mean scores obtained by Spinhoven, Ormel, Sloekers, and Kempen (1997) 
for adults aged 18 to 65 (M = 5.1, SD = 3.6). However, the same authors note a 
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small negative correlation between age and HAD-A score. Thus, the young age 
of the present sample may partially explain its high mean HAD-A score. 
  
Division of Participants into Groups 
 
Anxiety and depression are often viewed as continuous variables (Ruscio 
& Ruscio, 2000), especially within nonclinical populations. Using continuous 
variables to divide participants into arbitrary groups destroys information and 
detracts from statistical power (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Presenting the data 
as correlations avoids this problem and also has the advantage that the sizes of 
relationships can easily be assessed and compared. Thus, the primary analyses 
were t-tests of correlations between the emotion measures and the dependent 
variables. However, when significant correlations occurred, group analyses were 
conducted to allow absolute values of the dependent variables to be compared. 
For this purpose, participants were divided into groups based on the BDI-II 
ranges suggested by Dozois, Dobson, and Ahnberg (1998). These authors made 
their recommendations to preserve comparability to research using the widely 
cited (Haaga & Solomon, 1993) BDI-I cutoff scores recommended by Kendall, 
Hollon, Beck, Hammen, and Ingram (1987) for analogue depression research. 
Thus, participants were classified as nondepressed (BDI-II scores of 0 to 12, n = 
139), dysphoric (scores of 13 to 19, n = 40) or dysphoric-depressed (scores of 20 
or over, n = 21).  
Because there are no existing recommendations for division of 
participants into groups for analogue anxiety research, participants were simply 
divided into quartile groups according to their HAD-A score. Thus, participants 
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were classified as low anxiety (HAD-A scores of 0 to 5, n = 41), medium-low 
anxiety (scores of 6 to 8, n = 54), medium-high anxiety (scores of 9 or 10, n = 
45), or high anxiety (scores of 11 or above, n = 57). By coincidence, the range of 
scores in the medium-high anxiety group corresponds to the range Zigmond and 
Snaith (1983) suggest represents possible emotional disorder, and the range of 
scores in the high anxiety group corresponds to the range Herrmann (1997) 
suggests corresponds to abnormal anxiety. 
  
Explicit Memory Task 
 
The variable of interest was explicit memory bias score, which can be 
conceptualised as the difference between the number of negative words recalled 
and the number of positive words recalled. Rather than calculating a memory 
bias score by subtracting number of positive words recalled from number of 
negative words recalled, the relationship between the predictor variables and 
memory bias was calculated by conducting a correlation between the predictor 
variable and number of negative words recalled, while partialling out number of 
positive words recalled. This method of analysis results in superior statistical 
power, without increasing the chances of producing spurious findings (Cohen, 
1988). 
Table 1 shows that the predicted correlation between BDI-II score and 
memory bias score was significant (r = .120, p < .05). Memory bias score was 
not significantly related to HAD-A score (r = .090, p > .10). Partial correlations 
between depression, anxiety, and bias score were nonsignificant, but the pattern 
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of results was consistent with the prediction that depression mediated any 
relationship between anxiety and bias score. 
The relationships of the somatic and cognitive factors of depression to 
bias score were also compared. This correlation was stronger for the scale’s 
somatic factor (r = .124, p < .05) than for its cognitive-affective factor; the latter 
correlation did not reach significance (r = .095, p < .10). The partial correlation 
of bias with somatic depression, controlling for cognitive depression, was not 
significant (pr = .082, p > .10). The partial correlation of bias with cognitive 
depression, controlling for somatic depression, was also nonsignificant (pr = 
.006, p > .10). Although neither partial correlation is significant, the pattern of 
results is consistent with the prediction that somatic symptoms mediated any 
relationship between cognitive-affective symptoms and memory bias. 
Figure 1 shows the size of the negative bias shown by individuals from 
the different depression classifications. The dysphoric group did not show 
significantly more negative bias than did the nondepressed group (M = 0.95, SD 
= 2.05, vs. M = 0.84, SD = 1.96, t[174] = .314, p > .10). However, the dysphoric-
depressed group did show significantly more negative bias than the nondepressed 
group (M = 1.67, SD = 1.43, vs. M = 0.84, SD = 1.96, t[32.90] = 2.34, p < .05). 
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Table 1. 
Correlations Between Information Processing Bias Scores and Emotion Measures. 
 
 
Task Explicit 
memory 
Conceptual 
implicit 
memory 
(word 
association) 
 Perceptual 
implicit 
memory 
(word 
stem) 
 Emotional 
Stroop 
Attention 
Deploym-
ent 
Emotion 
measure
Negative 
words 
recalled  
(positive 
words 
recalled as 
covariate) 
Primed 
positive 
target words 
produced 
(adjusted for 
baseline) 
Primed 
negative 
target 
words 
produced 
(adjusted 
for 
baseline) 
Primed 
positive 
target 
words 
produced 
(adjusted 
for 
baseline) 
Primed 
negative 
target 
words 
produced 
(adjusted 
for 
baseline) 
Harmoni
c mean 
RT for 
sad 
words – 
harmonic 
mean RT 
for 
neutral 
words 
Percentage 
of trials 
coloured 
bar 
replacing 
sad word 
selected 
BDI-II pr = .120**
p = .047 
df = 194 
r = -.041 
p = .285 
n = 193 
r = .003 
p = .485 
n = 193 
r = .126 
 
n = 193 
r = -.009 
p = .453 
n = 193 
r = .027 
p = .353 
n = 193 
r = .172**
p = .050 
n = 93 
BDI-II 
somatic 
factor 
pr = .124** 
p = .042 
df = 194 
     r = .229**
p = .014 
n = 93 
BDI-II 
cognitive-
affective 
factor 
pr = .095*
p = .093 
df = 194 
     r = .082 
p = .217 
n = 93 
HAD-A pr = .090 
p = .106 
df = 191 
r = -.029 
p = .343 
n = 191 
r = .040 
p = .291 
n = 191 
r = .081 
 
n = 190 
r = .189***
p = .004 
n = 193 
r = -.058 
 
n = 190 
r = .195**
p = .031 
n = 92 
Partial 
correlation 
with BDI-II 
controlling 
for HAD-A 
pr =  .083 
p = .123 
df = 190 
   pr = -.199ψ
 
df = 187 
 pr = .055 
p = .303 
df = 89 
Partial 
correlation 
with HAD-A 
controlling 
for BDI-II 
pr = .022 
p = .381 
df = 190 
   pr = 
.270****
p = .000 
df = 187 
 pr = .122 
p = .125 
df = 89 
 
 
* indicates near significance (p < .10). ** indicates significant at p < .05. *** 
indicates significant at p < .01. **** indicates significant at p < .001. All t-tests 
were one-tailed. p values for correlations in the direction opposite to that 
predicted are not reported as one-tailed t-tests have no statistical power in this 
circumstance. The use of two-tailed t-tests would have produced one additional 
significant finding, marked ψ, as noted in the main text. BDI-II factor correlations 
were calculated only when the BDI-II correlated significantly with the relevant 
variable. Partial correlations were calculated only when the BDI-II or HAD-A 
correlated significantly with the relevant variable. 
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Figure 1. 
Depression group and negative bias in explicit memory. 
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Word Stem Completion Task 
 
 So that correlational analyses could be conducted, an estimate of the 
amount of priming that was experienced by each individual participant was 
calculated. First, baseline performance for each word set was calculated; this is 
equal to the mean number of target words completed by participants for whom it 
was the unprimed word set. The number of target words completed by each 
participant in his or her primed condition was adjusted by subtracting the 
baseline number of target words produced in that word set. These calculations 
result in the adjusted for baseline number of positive and negative words 
produced. These are the dependent variables and are best-estimates of 
the amount of priming experienced by each participant2. 
 Table 1 shows that adjusted-for-baseline number of positive target words 
was not significantly correlated with either BDI-II or HAD-A score. Adjusted 
number of negative target words produced was not significantly correlated with 
the BDI-II. However, there was a significant correlation in the predicted 
direction between HAD-A score and adjusted number of negative target words 
produced (r = .189, p < .01). Moreover, this correlation increases in strength 
when BDI-II score is statistically controlled for (pr = .270, p < .001). There is 
also an unpredicted negative correlation between BDI-II score and adjusted 
                                                 
2 The results are similar when baseline is not controlled for. As predicted, most indices of 
unprimed performance were unaffected by mood. Adjusted for baseline number of unprimed 
positive target words produced did not correlate with either BDI-II score (r = .026, p > .10) or 
HAD-A score (r = .077, p > .10). Adjusted number of unprimed negative target words produced 
did not correlate with HAD-A score (r = .067, p > .10). However, adjusted number of unprimed 
negative target words produced did correlate with BDI-II score (r = .149, p < .05). This does not 
affect the priming analyses because as reported in the main text, adjusted number of primed 
negative target words produced did not correlate with BDI-II score. 
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number of negative target words produced when HAD-A is statistically 
controlled for. This correlation was in the opposite direction to that predicted, but 
it should be noted that it would have been significant had a two-tailed t-test been 
conducted (pr = -.199, p < .01, two-tailed). This unexpected finding may be the 
result of the positive correlation between HAD-A score and number of negative 
target words produced. 
 Figure 2 shows the relationship between anxiety group and mean adjusted 
number of primed negative target words produced. The predicted difference 
between the top and bottom quartiles was significant (M = 1.20, SD = 1.25 vs. M 
= 0.69, SD = 1.23, t[94] = 1.91, p < .05).  
Finally, there was also a significant difference between the primed and 
unprimed conditions in adjusted-for-baseline number of words produced, for 
both the positive (M = 1.16, SD = 1.39 vs. M = 0.07, SD = 0.93, t[192] = 9.32, p 
< .001) and negative (M = 1.09, SD = 1.38 vs. M = 0.04, SD = 1.11, t[192] = 
8.97, p < .001) word sets. This shows that priming did take place. 
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Figure 2. 
Word stem task: priming of negative target words in each anxiety quartile. 
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Word Association Task
 
 The dependent variables in the word association task were calculated in 
an identical way to those in the word stem completion task. As Table 1 shows, 
neither adjusted for baseline positive nor adjusted for baseline negative target 
word production was related to either BDI-II or HAD-A score. Again, for the 
participants as a whole, adjusted for baseline primed number of target words 
produced was significantly greater than baseline for both the positive stimuli (M 
= 0.81, SD = 1.10, vs. M = 0.02, SD = 0.89; t[192] = 7.63, p < .001) and the 
negative stimuli (M = 0.63, SD = 1.23, vs. M = -0.04, SD = 1.07; t[192] = 6.12, p 
< .001). 
 A post-hoc power analysis was conducted to gain an idea of whether the 
failure of the experiment to find significant associations between BDI-II or 
HAD-A score and priming was due to insufficient statistical power. If the true r 
between priming and BDI-II or HAD-A was .15, then to obtain 90% power with 
191 participants in a one-tailed correlational t-test would require setting alpha to 
.21. As Table 1 shows, none of the observed correlations were significant by this 
criterion. Although the post-hoc nature of these calculations calls for caution, the 
results indicates that insufficient power is a relatively unlikely explanation of the 
lack of significant relationships between the variables. 
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Emotional Stroop Task
 
 Reaction times less than 200ms or greater than 2000ms were considered 
outliers and removed from the data. Harmonic means, rather than means or 
medians, were calculated for each participant in each condition, because for 
reaction time data, this transformation produces a more reliable estimate of 
central tendency (Ratcliff, 1993). 
 Past research with the emotional Stroop task has been carried out using 
specialised response boxes, but in the present experiment standard PC keyboards 
were used. Consequently, split-half reliability was used to estimate the accuracy 
with which participant’s response times were being measured. This was 
determined by calculating the correlation between the harmonic mean reaction 
time for each participant’s odd-numbered trials and the corresponding harmonic 
mean reaction time for each participant’s even-numbered trials. For the neutral 
stimuli, the split-half reliability was .921, and for the negative stimuli, the split-
half reliability was .944 (both p < .001, n = 193). By the Spearman-Brown 
prophecy formula (Spearman, 1910), the estimated reliabilities of the harmonic 
means of the complete set of reaction times to the neutral and negative stimuli 
are 0.959 and 0.971, respectively. This demonstrates that reaction times were 
measured accurately enough for any relationship with the emotion measures to 
be revealed. 
 The dependent variable was the harmonic mean of each participant’s 
reaction time to the negative stimuli, minus that participant’s harmonic mean 
reaction time to the neutral stimuli. This was taken to be an index of Stroop 
interference caused by the negative stimuli. As Table 1 shows, this interference 
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index did not correlate significantly with either BDI-II or HAD-A scores. For all 
participants combined, the value of the interference index did not significantly 
differ from 0 (M = 1.09 ms, SD = 30.75, t[192] = 0.49, p > .10), which means 
that participants were no slower to respond to the negative stimuli than they were 
to respond to the neutral stimuli. 
 A post-hoc power analysis was conducted to gain an idea of whether the 
failure of the experiment to find significant associations between BDI-II or 
HAD-A score and Stroop interference was due to insufficient statistical power. If 
the true r between priming and BDI-II or HAD-A was .15, then to obtain 90% 
power with 190 participants in a one-tailed correlational t-test would require 
setting alpha to .21. As Table 1 shows, neither of the observed correlations were 
significant by this criterion. Although the post-hoc nature of these calculations 
calls for caution, this results indicates that insufficient power is a relatively 
unlikely explanation of the lack of significant relationships between the 
variables. 
 
Attention Deployment Task 
 
 The dependent variable was the number of times that the participant 
decided that the coloured bar that replaced the negative word appeared first, as a 
percentage of total trials. Table 1 shows that the predicted correlation between 
BDI-II score and percentage negative selected reached significance (r = .172, p = 
.05). As was the case with the explicit memory task, bias is more closely related 
to the somatic factor of the scale (r = .229, p < .05) than to the cognitive-affective 
factor; the latter correlation is nonsignificant (r = .082, p > .10). Partial 
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correlations were consistent with these results. Controlling for the cognitive-
affective factor, the somatic factor was significantly associated with negative 
bias in attention (pr = .240, p < .05), whereas the partial correlation between the 
cognitive-affective factor and negative bias, controlling for the somatic factor, 
was nonsigificant (pr = -.111, p > .10). (Note that this finding cannot be 
explained by a closer association between the somatic factor and anxiety than 
between the cognitive-affective factor and anxiety, because in fact the somatic 
factor is somewhat less associated with HAD-A score than is the cognitive-
affective factor; r = .513 and r = .578, respectively, both p < .001). Also as 
predicted, HAD-A score is significantly correlated with percentage negative 
selected (r = .195, p < .05). Neither BDI-II controlling for HAD-A nor HAD-A 
controlling for BDI-II correlates significantly with percentage negative selected 
(pr = .055 and pr = .122, respectively, both p > .10). 
 McCabe and Gotlib (1995) recommend determining whether reaction 
times to the stimuli are related to the emotion measures. The idea behind this is 
that if emotional state is affecting motivation to follow the task instructions, 
reaction times will be influenced by emotional state. However, median reaction 
time, averaged across neutral and sad stimuli, was uncorrelated with BDI-II and 
HAD-A scores (r = .041, n = 93 and r = .040, n = 92, both p > .10). This finding 
suggests that the effect of depression and anxiety on stimuli selection is not 
mediated by motivation. 
 As noted by Gotlib, McLachlan, and Katz (1988), a correlation between a 
measure of emotion and attention deployment does not, in itself, reveal which 
participants are showing a bias. To examine this issue, one sample t-tests were 
conducted comparing the mean percentage negative stimuli chosen by each 
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group to chance (50%), to determine which groups showed positive biases. As 
Figure 3 shows, nondepressed participants chose the negative stimuli 
significantly less frequently than 50% of the time (M = 47.88, SD = 6.79, t[68] = 
2.59, p < .01), but dysphoric and dysphoric-depressed participants did not (M = 
50.5, SD = 5.53, t[14] = .374, p > .10; M = 49.33, SD = 3.46, t[8] = 2.59, p > 
.10). However, because the dysphoric and dysphoric-depressed groups were 
smaller in size than the nondepressed group, it could be argued that the reason 
these groups did not show a significant positive bias was because of lack of 
statistical power. For this reason, the data were reanalysed in groups of roughly 
equal size, by dividing the participants into quartiles by BDI-II score. The ranges 
of BDI-II scores within the quartiles were: lowest, 0 to 5 (n = 57); medium-low, 
6 to 9 (n = 52); medium-high, 10 to 14 (n = 43); highest, 15 or over (n = 48). 
As Figure 4 shows, participants in each of the two lower depression 
quartiles showed a significant positive bias (M = 47.59, SD = 7.53, t[28] = 1.73; 
M = 47.15, SD = 6.67, t[25] = 2.18, both p < .05). Participants in each of the two 
upper depression quartiles did not show a significant bias (M = 50.10, SD = 5.82, 
t[19] = 0.08; M = 49.89, SD = 3.85, t[17] = 0.122, both p > .10). As Figure 5 
shows, only participants in the lowest HAD-A quartile showed a significant 
positive bias (M = 46.21, SD = 7.55, t[27] = 2.65, p < .01). Participants in the 
other three quartiles did not show a significant bias (M = 48.86, SD = 6.74, t[20] 
= 0.78; M = 50.11, SD = 5.83, t[18] = 0.08; M = 49.08, SD = 4.33, t[23] = 1.04, 
all p > .10). 
T-tests were also conducted comparing mean percentage negative stimuli 
selected in the top and bottom quartiles of the data. This difference was near 
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significance for depression (t[43.76] = 1.38, p < .10) and was significant for 
anxiety (t[44.10] = 1.71, p < .05). 
Finally, to confirm that the mean differences in attention deployment 
were really the result of more participants in the lower quartiles showing positive 
biases, rather than fewer participants in these quartiles showing negative biases, 
post hoc analyses were conducted to determine the number of individuals in each 
quartile who were positively biased. By the binomial theorem, the chance of a 
given participant randomly selecting the negative stimuli 40% or less of the time 
(over 50 trials) is p = .10. Table 2 shows the proportion of participants from each 
emotion group who were positively biased by this criterion. There are 
significantly more positively biased participants in the lowest depression group 
than in the highest depression group (t[28] = 2.70, p < .01), and also significantly 
more positively biased participants in the lowest anxiety group than in the 
highest anxiety group (t[27] = 2.71, p < .01). 
 
Table 2. 
Attention Deployment Task: Proportion Positively Biased Participants in Each 
Emotion Group.
 Depression quartile 
groups 
 
Percentage positively 
biased (at p ≤ .10) 
Anxiety quartile groups 
 
Percentage positively 
biased (at p ≤ .10) 
Lowest 21 % 21 % 
Medium-low 15 % 14 % 
Medium-high 5 % 11 % 
Highest 0 % 0 % 
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Nondepressed Dysphoric Dysphoric-Depressed
n = 69 n = 15 n = 9
***
 
 
*** indicates significantly different from chance (p < .01). 
 
Figure 3. 
Relationship between depression category and percentage of trials attention 
deployed towards negative stimuli. 
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Figure 4. 
Relationship between depression quartile and percentage of trials attention 
deployed towards negative stimuli. 
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Figure 5. 
Relationship between anxiety quartile and percentage of trials attention deployed 
towards negative stimuli. 
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Discussion 
 
 Relevant to Aim 1. Several of the experimental hypotheses were 
supported. As predicted, explicit memory bias was significantly associated with 
depression, but not with anxiety. In contrast, but also as predicted, perceptual 
implicit memory bias was significantly associated with anxiety, but not with 
depression. Strengthening this finding, the association between implicit memory 
bias and anxiety remained significant even when depression was controlled for. 
For the deployment of attention task, as predicted, participants low in depression 
and anxiety showed a positive bias. Also as predicted, both anxiety and 
depression were significantly related to the erosion of this positive bias. Partial 
correlations were unable to disentangle the contribution of anxiety from that of 
depression, but the trend was in the predicted direction. 
 Two of the hypotheses were not supported. It was predicted that 
conceptual implicit memory bias would be related to depression, but not to 
anxiety, and that emotional Stroop interference would be related to anxiety, but 
not to depression. However, neither of these tasks showed any relationship to 
either anxiety or depression. There are a number of possible explanations to 
consider in the case of the Stroop task. One possibility is that lack of statistical 
power led to the null finding, but although the emotional Stroop effect may be 
weak in nonclinical samples, and the effect has not always been consistently 
replicated (MacLeod & Hagan, 1992, supraliminal condition), the sample size of 
this experiment was large in comparison to most existing studies. As discussed in 
the results section, this means that lack of statistical power was a relatively 
unlikely explanation for the lack of significant findings. Similarly, the accuracy 
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of the computer’s measurement of reaction time, and the number of trials, appear 
to have been adequate to accurately determine the mean reaction time in each 
condition for each participant. It is also unlikely that the use of key presses, 
rather than voice, to make responses is responsible for the nonreplication, 
because strong findings have been obtained using this modality before 
(Dalgleish, 1995). A final possibility is that the incorporation of the Stroop task 
into a battery of tasks involving the processing of negative information led to the 
null finding. Repeated exposure and habituation to the negative information may 
reduce the power of this information to distract the participant from the task at 
hand (Dozois & Dobson, 2001). Lending strength to this idea, Dozois and 
Dobson (2001) also found no emotional Stroop effect occurred when they 
included the Stroop in a battery of other tasks with emotional content. Further 
research could test this possibility.  
In the case of the conceptual implicit memory task, insufficient statistical 
power also seems an unlikely explanation, leaving two salient explanations. First, 
the free association task may be unreliable, as evidenced by P. C. Watkins et al.'s 
(2000) nonreplication of their earlier study. Second, because a clinically 
diagnosed sample was used in both the studies that have found an association 
between depression and conceptual implicit memory bias, it is possible that the 
effect occurs only in clinical populations. To test the first of these possibilities, 
Experiment 2 will investigate the relationship between depression and conceptual 
implicit memory bias using a different test of conceptual implicit memory. 
Relevant to Aim 2. Support was obtained for the hypothesis that the 
somatic, rather than cognitive, symptoms of depression are related to information 
processing bias. In both cases where total depression score was related to 
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negative bias, somatic factor score was significantly related to negative bias, but 
cognitive factor score was not. Moreover, when partial correlations were 
conducted involving the two factor scores and bias score, the somatic factor 
remained significantly associated with attentional bias, whereas the cognitive 
factor showed no evidence of influencing attention in a negative direction. 
Although nonsignificant, the pattern of partial correlations obtained for the 
explicit memory task was also consistent in direction with the hypothesis. 
 Relevant to Subsidiary Aim 1. Contrary to prediction, only participants in 
the bottom 25 to 50% of anxiety and depression scores showed a positive bias on 
the deployment of attention task. This contradicts the assumption of previous 
authors that subclinically depressed or anxious participants differ from the norm; 
rather, people who are unusually low in anxiety and depression appear to differ 
from the norm. 
 Relevant to Subsidiary Aim 4. Only two of the information processing 
tasks from Experiment 1 proved to be related to depression, and these 
relationships were moderate. Thus, the battery of tasks used in Experiment 1 
would probably not, in itself, be useful as an assessment of depression. 
Experiment 2 examines a variety of other possible measures. 
 Rationale of Experiment 2. Experiment 1 found support for both the 
elaboration-priming hypothesis and the somatic-cognitive symptom hypothesis. 
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate these findings and extend them to a 
broader range of tasks. Thus, the experiment included a test of interpretation of 
ambiguous information – the homophone interpretation task (Eysenck et al., 
1987). Williams et al. (1997) suggest that anxiety will control biases in 
homophone interpretation (p. 282). The logic behind this prediction is that 
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priming makes material more likely to be activated when relevant perceptual 
features are presented. The homophone task involves presenting perceptual 
features of a negative word, and so priming, rather than elaboration, should affect 
homophone interpretation. Because Williams et al. (1997) argue that anxiety, 
rather than depression, affects priming, their theory predicts that anxiety, rather 
than depression, should affect homophone interpretation. Thus, including the 
homophone interpretation task in Experiment 2 means that the experiment can 
test a novel hypothesis derived from the theory. 
Second, autobiographical memory is often thought to play a particularly 
important role in depression (Williams, 1992), and so a task that measures 
autobiographical memory was incorporated. The inclusion of an autobiographical 
memory task also has a fortuitous advantage. Experiments that have found that 
depressed people report unhappy autobiographical memories are often criticised 
on the grounds that any group differences shown could be due to veridical 
differences in life history, rather than to information processing bias. However, 
separating out the cognitive and somatic symptoms of depression provides a 
unique way of examining the relative contributions of cognitive bias and 
veridical differences. Negative life events should have the same impact on the 
two types of depression symptoms3. This means that the veridical difference 
explanation predicts similar correlations between rated happiness of recalled 
events and the somatic and cognitive symptoms of depression. Conversely, 
Experiment 1 showed that the somatic symptoms of depression were more 
strongly associated with negative biases in information processing than were the 
                                                 
3 If anything, one would expect that events would affect the cognitive symptoms more; for 
example, failure experiences might lead to the belief that one had failed more than others, or a 
generally negative life history might lead to the belief that there is little hope for the future. 
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cognitive symptoms. Thus, the information processing bias explanation predicts 
that the somatic symptoms of depression will be more strongly associated with 
the recall of unhappy memories than the cognitive symptoms will be. If this 
pattern is found, then this would support the hypothesis that the negative 
memories produced by depressed individuals are due to cognitive bias, rather 
than being solely due to veridical differences in life history. 
The free association test of conceptual implicit memory bias did not 
appear to be affected by anxiety or depression in Experiment 1. As noted, P. C. 
Watkins et al. (2000) obtained similar results, but did find that a word-retrieval 
task, also intended as a test of bias in conceptual implicit memory, was related to 
depression. For this reason, in Experiment 2 the free association task was 
replaced with a word-retrieval task. 
The explicit memory task was affected by depression in Experiment 1, 
but this effect may have occurred despite the presence of minor methodological 
problems. First, participants were not explicitly asked to encode the words self-
referentially, and it has been suggested that when information is self-referentially 
encoded, mood-congruent memory is especially likely to occur (Blaney, 1986). 
Second, the relatively small number of words involved in the task meant that a 
few participants showed perfect or near-perfect recall for either the positive or 
negative word list, meaning that ceiling effects may have occurred. Third, the 
word lists were not balanced for word frequency. Thus, in an attempt to obtain a 
larger effect size, the explicit memory task from Experiment 1 was adapted by 
presenting participants with a greater number of words to be learnt, by including 
neutral words in the task, and by balancing the word frequencies of the valenced 
lists. These objectives were accomplished by using the word list presented by 
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Rusting (1999). The twin objectives of including an incidental memory task, and 
a memory task that explicitly required self-referent encoding, were accomplished 
by implementing incidental recall of the words encoded during the imagination 
task (the encoding stage of the implicit conceptual task). 
Because autobiographical memory pleasantness was measured in the 
experiment, I took advantage of the data from the same task to measure 
autobiographical specificity. As noted in the literature review, overgeneral 
memory has been linked to clinical depression, but not to subclinical depression. 
It was hypothesised that this finding would be replicated. However, Merckelbach 
et al. (1996) did find that overgeneral recall was related to left-hemispheric 
thinking style. This finding was opposite in direction to their prediction that 
people with a right-hemispheric dominant thinking style would pay less attention 
to detail and would thus be more likely to produce overgeneral memories. These 
authors speculated that different findings might result if neutral, rather than 
emotional, cue words were used. Neutral cue words were used in Experiment 2, 
and for this reason, no prediction was ventured as to the direction of the 
hypothesised effect of thinking style on specificity. In addition to investigating 
the effect of thinking style, because different types of memory abilities are likely 
to be related (Jensen, 1998), it was predicted that poor memory for word lists 
would be associated with poor ability to recall specific autobiographical events. 
It was also hypothesised that thinking style would influence performance 
on the emotional homophone task. Right hemispheric thinking is thought to be 
specialised for emotional processing (Borod et al., 2002), and so it was 
hypothesised that right-hemisphere dominant individuals would make a greater 
number of emotional interpretations of both positive and negative homophones. 
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Because of time constraints on the length of the experiment, the 
emotional Stroop, perceptual implicit memory, and DOAT tasks were not 
included in Experiment 2. 
In summary, it was hypothesised that 
Relevant to Aim 1 
1. Negative bias in implicit conceptual, explicit incidental, and explicit 
intentional word list recall, and in autobiographical memory, would be directly 
associated with depression, but not directly associated with anxiety. 
2. Negative bias in the emotional homophones task would be directly 
associated with anxiety, but not directly associated with depression. Specifically, 
based on the findings of Wenzlaff and Eisenberg (2001), it was expected that 
participants in negative emotional states would interpret neutral-negative 
homophones as negative, and neutral-positive homophones as neutral, more often 
than participants in positive mood states. 
Relevant to Aim 2 
3. When negative bias scores correlated significantly with depression, 
they would correlate more strongly with the somatic factor than with the 
cognitive-affective factor of the inventory used. 
Relevant to Subsidiary Aim 2 
4. Autobiographical specificity would not be related to depression or 
anxiety, but would be related to thinking style as measured by the hemispheric 
preference test (PT; Zenhausern, 1978), and to memory ability on the explicit 
word list tasks. 
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Relevant to Subsidiary Aim 3 
5. Right-hemispheric thinking style, as measured by the PT, would be 
associated with the production of greater numbers of emotional homophones, 
both positive and negative. 
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Experiment 2 
 
Method 
 
Overview 
 
 Undergraduate psychology students, selected for high or low level of 
depressive symptomatology, completed five computer-administered tasks 
designed to measure mood-congruent bias. Four of these tasks examined 
memory. The tasks were a conceptual implicit memory test, an incidental self-
referent memory test, an intentional recall task, an autobiographical memory 
task, and a homophone interpretation task. Dependent variables were the number 
of negatively and positively valenced words recalled in each of the memory 
tasks, the number of specific memories recalled in the autobiographical memory 
task, the self-rated mean pleasantness of the autobiographical memories 
produced, and the number of negative and positive interpretations made of the 
aurally presented homophones. Following the computer-administered tasks, the 
participants were administered the BDI – II and the BAI. 
 
Participants 
 
 Participants were psychology undergraduate students at Victoria 
University, recruited from the psychology research pool. The preselection 
process involved 980 participants, and 148 participants took part in the 
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experiment itself. Participants in the experiment had the option to supply 
demographic data. Of those who answered, 104 were female and 43 were male. 
The median age of the participants was 19 years. There were 123 New Zealand 
European participants, 11 Asian, 10 New Zealand Maori, and 3 of other 
ethnicity. Potential participants were excluded from the experiment if English 
was not their first language. Participants were given course credit for their 
participation.  
 
Materials 
 
 Participants were selected using the Beck Depression Inventory – Short 
Form (BDI-SF; Beck & Beck, 1972), a 13-item questionnaire that correlates .96 
with the original version of the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck & 
Beamesderfer, 1974). After the experimental session, depression and anxiety 
were measured with the BDI-II and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & 
Steer, 1993). The BDI-II was described in the method section of Experiment 1. 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory is empirically supported and widely recommended 
(Crits-Christoph & Connolly, 1997), and there is evidence that it better 
discriminates anxiety from depression than does the other commonly used self-
report anxiety measure, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Bieling et al., 1998). 
 Thinking style was measured using the Hemispheric Preference Test (PT; 
Zenhausern, 1978), a pencil-and-paper measure for which there is some evidence 
of validity (Merckelbach, de Jong, & Muris, 1990; Merckelbach, Muris, Pool et 
al., 1996). Handedness was measured using a standard handedness questionnaire 
(Coren, 1992). 
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Apparatus 
 
 The experimental computer program was custom designed in Visual Basic, 
and is available on request. The program was run on Pentium III computers with 
standard colour CRT monitors, under Windows 98. 
 
Procedure 
 
 Preselection of participants. Participants were administered the BDI-SF as 
part of a mass testing session. The questionnaire was accompanied by an 
assortment of questionnaires on other experimental topics, including the PT. This 
questionnaire served both to actually measure thinking style, and to distract 
experimental participants from their selection on the basis of mood. Participants 
with BDI-SF scores of zero to three, or of seven or above, were invited to take 
part in the experimental session described below, using a list of student identity 
numbers on a psychology research pool recruitment board. If participants asked 
why they had been chosen to take part in the study, they were informed that the 
decision was made on the basis of data collected during the mass testing session, 
but they were not informed that they had been chosen on the basis of their 
responses to the BDI-SF. 
 The experimental session. Experimental sessions began two weeks after the 
mass testing session. Participants were tested in groups of up to ten. Participants 
were seated in front of their own computer. The room was laid out such that 
individual responses were not visible to other participants. The experimenter was 
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present throughout the duration of the experiment. Instructions on the individual 
tasks were displayed on the computer screen. Binary or Likert scale choices were 
made using the computer keyboard, and all other responses were made in a 
booklet supplied by the experimenter. 
 The introduction to the study, the encoding and retrieval stages of the 
implicit memory test, and the incidental recall task were conducted before the 
other tasks, in the order presented below. The remaining three experimental tasks 
were presented in counterbalanced order. It was not possible to counterbalance 
order of presentation of the implicit memory task, because this would have 
allowed the word stimuli used in the other experimental tasks to contaminate 
performance in the implicit memory task. Similarly, it was necessary for the 
incidental recall task to directly follow the implicit memory task, because it 
shared recall stimuli with that task.  
 After the participants had finished the computerised tasks, the computer 
administered an experimental purpose awareness question, and the experimenter 
administered the mood questionnaires. 
 Introduction to the study. The participants were told that they were taking 
part in an experiment looking at the effect of thinking style on a variety of tasks, 
and that the precise hypotheses of the experiment would be explained once it had 
been completed. They then gave their informed consent.  
 The experimenter then instructed the participants to fill out a questionnaire 
asking for basic demographic data, to wear the headphones supplied, to follow 
the instructions given by the computer with great care, and to ask the 
experimenter for help immediately if they should become confused by any aspect 
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of the procedure. The questionnaire also asked for the participants’ student ID 
numbers, for matching with the BDI-SF scores collected earlier. 
 Handedness distracter questionnaire. The participants were then asked to fill 
out a handedness questionnaire (Coren, 1992), to reinforce the description of the 
study as an experiment on thinking styles. 
 The conceptual implicit memory test. In outline, the participants were asked 
to elaboratively encode a list of positive and negative words, and then their 
implicit memory for these words was tested with a word retrieval task. The 
procedure for this task was based on the conceptual implicit memory tasks used 
by Watkins, Vache, Verney, & Mathews (1996) and Watkins, Martin, & Stern 
(2000). 
 Encoding task. The encoding task was identical to the one used in 
Experiment 1, but this time an explanation was given for the task: participants 
were told that it measured aspects of their imaginative ability. The encoding task 
was followed by the thirty-second m-search distracter task also used in 
Experiment 1, and this was explained as a test of visual search ability. The 
participants were told that the task would be conducted in several short sessions 
to minimize visual fatigue. 
 Retrieval task. The participants were told that this task was a test of their 
linguistic ability. They were told that the computer would be present them with 
some definitions, and that they were to think of words that fitted those 
definitions. Each definition corresponded to a target word in either the studied or 
the unstudied word set, for a total of 32 definitions. In contrast to Watkins et al. 
(1996), who recorded responses on a tape recorder, in this experiment responses 
were written into the supplied booklet. The participants were given 20 seconds to 
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respond to each cue definition, followed by a tone and the immediate onset of the 
next cue definition. Word definitions were adapted from a standard dictionary 
(Knight, 1993). Unlike in the experiment conducted by Watkins et al. (2000), 
participants were not supplied with the first letter of each target word. Positive 
and negative cue definitions were alternated. 
 The self-referent incidental recall task. Participants again completed the 30-
second distracter task. They were then explicitly asked to recall the 16 cue words 
presented in the imagination task. They were given two and a half minutes to 
complete this task, including reading the instructions. Responses were written 
into the supplied booklet. 
 The remaining three experimental tasks were conducted in counterbalanced 
order. 
 The intentional recall task. Participants were told this was a second test of 
their memory ability. They were told that they would be given two minutes to 
learn a word list, and that they would have to recall it later in the experiment. 
They were then presented with the 36 words (12 negative, 12 positive, and 12 
neutral) used in the incidental recall task conducted by Rusting (1999). All the 
words were presented simultaneously, positioned in individually randomised 
order with the restriction that no more than two words of any valence were 
presented in sequence. Following the learning procedure, the participants 
performed the m-search distracter task for one minute. They were then given two 
minutes to recall the words. Responses were written into the supplied booklet. 
 The autobiographical memory task. Participants were told that this was a test 
of their ability to recall events from their own lives. The computer directed 
participants to the appropriate page in their booklet, which contained the task 
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instructions. Participants were told that they were to record the first specific 
memory that came to mind after they were presented with each of a series of 
twenty cue words. They were told that specific memories were of a single event, 
rather than a summary of a series of events, and that specific memories covered a 
time span of no more than one day. They were also given examples of three 
specific and three nonspecific memories. They were then told that they would 
have a maximum of 50 seconds to recall and record each event, after which they 
would be prompted to stop trying and move on to the next cue word4. They were 
told to hit the space bar to indicate when they had remembered and recorded an 
event description. The instruction sheet contained two example cues, to which 
they were to produce appropriate responses and show these to the experimenter 
to confirm they had understood the task instructions regarding specificity. The 
experimenter gave the participants further opportunity to practice if they did not 
produce at least one specific example. If only one specific example was 
produced, the experimenter explained this and explained why. The computer then 
presented ten neutral cue words to the participants in the manner described 
above. The cue words were replicated from List A of Clark (1982), and presented 
in fixed order. Participants were then asked three questions about each of the 
events they had described: 
1. How vividly do you remember the event now?  
2. How pleasant was the event? 
3. How sure are you that the event really happened? 
 The questions were answered on anchored nine-point Likert scales. Question 
two was the only critical item; the other questions were used to distract the 
                                                 
4 There were two reasons for using time pressure in this task. First, I wanted to move participants 
through the tasks as quickly as possible. Second, introducing time pressure helps distract 
participants from the true nature of the task (Kumari et al., 1998). 
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participants from the real purpose of the experiment. The participants were asked 
whether the events were pleasant or unpleasant rather than happy or unhappy 
because the former question is less suggestive of the experimental purpose, but 
produces answers very highly correlated with answers to the latter question 
(Mayo, 1983). Similarly, self-ratings rather than independent ratings of 
pleasantness were conducted, because self- and independent ratings of 
pleasantness are very highly correlated (Mayo, 1983; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). 
Participants were instructed to move rapidly through the questions, and told that 
it was their first impressions that were of most interest. Responses were given 
using the computer keyboard.  
 The homophone interpretation task. Participants were told that this was a 
test of spelling ability, and that spelling ability is related to general memory 
performance. The instructions explained that words would be presented through 
the headphones, and that the participants were to spell the words in the booklet 
provided. They were also informed that they would be under time pressure 
during the experiment, and so to just guess when they were unsure. The 
participants were then presented with five neutral practice words, and given the 
opportunity to practice again if necessary. They were then presented with the 
experimental word list. The critical items were 12 negative and 12 positive 
homophones. Twenty-one of these were sourced from Wenzlaff & Eisenberg 
(2001), but the other three words used in this experiment were replaced because 
of local differences in pronunciation and word meaning – these words were 
sourced from Rusting (1999) and Halberstadt, Niedenthal, and Kushner (1995). 
There was no significant difference in mean written word frequency (Kucera & 
Francis, 1967) between the emotional and neutral interpretations of either the 
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positive or negative homophones (both p > .10). There were also 36 unvalenced 
filler words, including homophones and non-homophones. Most of these were 
sourced from a list of words that had been misspelt in university entrance exam 
papers (Wing & Baddeley, 1980). Following Wenzlaff and Eisenberg (2001), the 
words were presented with a three second interval between the onsets of 
sequential words. 
 Administration of the mood questionnaires. After the participants had 
finished all of the computerized tasks, the computer prompted them to turn to the 
final page of the experimental booklet, which contained two ruled lines and was 
simply labelled “Comprehension”. They were instructed “Please very briefly 
describe what you think the intended purpose of this experiment was, or else 
write 'Don't know'”. The computer then prompted the participants to ask the 
experimenter for the final questionnaires. The experimenter gave the participants 
the BDI-II, the BAI, and a brief questionnaire asking whether they had a history 
of treatment for anxiety or depression. Participants were asked to record their 
randomised matching codes in the place of the field labelled “name”. Participants 
were given the option of not answering some or all questionnaire items. 
Participants were then thoroughly debriefed, and asked not to talk to other 
students about the purpose of the experiment. 
 A word about word stimuli. Except for the sharing of target words between 
the implicit memory and incidental recall tasks, no word stimulus was used in 
more than one experimental task. 
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Results 
 
The experimenter was blind to responses to the emotion measures while 
scoring task responses, and while making decisions about excluding participants 
from analyses. Exclusion criteria were determined before the data were analysed. 
One-tailed t-tests were used for the analyses of mood and bias (see discussion of 
the use of this statistical method in the results section of Experiment 1), but two-
tailed t-tests were used in the analyses of the additional hypotheses, because the 
predictions made were based on theory rather than replication of existing 
experiments. All power calculations were conducted using the GPOWER 
computer program (Erdfelder et al., 1996). 
 
Cleaning of the Data 
 
Exclusions for Poor Data Quality 
 
 Participants were excluded from the homophones task if, more than once, 
they recorded both possible spellings of a homophone (which may indicate too 
much knowledge of the experimental purpose). Participants were also excluded 
for failing to give responses to more than two critical items. Ten participants 
were excluded from the homophone task for these reasons. Participants were 
excluded from the incidental memory task for producing a high outlier number of 
intrusions (nine or more; four participants excluded), which was interpreted as 
failure to understand task instructions. One participant was excluded from the 
autobiographical memory valence task, because all except one of the ratings of 
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vividness, pleasantness, and certainty were invariant. Participants were also 
excluded from analyses involving individual tasks in the rare instance that they 
failed to correctly complete that task, and from the autobiographical memory 
specificity analyses if they failed to present examples to the experimenter to be 
checked (three participants excluded). 
 
Excluding Participants Because of Understanding of the Experimental Purpose 
 
 Participants whose answers to the comprehension question demonstrated 
that they understood the overall experimental purpose were excluded from nearly 
all analyses, because of their susceptibility to demand effects. They were, 
however included in the autobiographical memory specificity analyses, because 
no participant evidenced understanding of this aspect of the task. Eleven 
participants were excluded because of experimental understanding, nine from the 
nondepressed group, one from the dysphoric group, and one from the dysphoric-
depressed group (see below for the division of participants into depression 
group). Similarly, three of these participants fell into the low anxiety group, four 
into the medium-low anxiety group, three into the medium-high anxiety group, 
and one into the high anxiety group.  
 Participants who appeared to understand the mechanism of individual 
tasks, for example, that the linguistic ability test was an implicit memory test or 
that the spelling task involved choice between spellings of homophones, were 
excluded from analyses of these specific tasks. For this reason, an additional ten 
participants were excluded from the homophone task, five from the linguistic 
ability task, and six from the autobiographical memory task. 
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Depression and Anxiety Measures 
 
 The mean BDI-II score was 9.99, which is similar to the mean value of 
9.11 found in the large unselected student sample reported by Dozois, Dobson, 
and Ahnberg (1998). The standard deviation of the BDI-II scores (9.63) was 
somewhat higher than the standard deviation (7.57) found in that sample, as 
would be expected given that the participants were selected for high or low 
depression scores. The mean BAI score was 9.71 (SD = 8.12), which is similar to 
the mean (9.15) and standard deviation (7.41) found for a large unselected 
sample by Lovibond and Lovibond (1995). 
 
Division of Participants into Groups 
 
As in Experiment 1, participants were divided into nondepressed (n = 
104), dysphoric (n = 20) or dysphoric-depressed groups (n = 24), as 
recommended by Dozois et al. (1998). By participant report, 5% of nondepressed 
participants, 25% of dysphoric participants, and 29% of dysphoric-depressed 
participants had undergone formal treatment for depression during the past year; 
this supports the contention that the levels of distress examined by this study 
were in at least some cases comparable to those encountered in clinical practice. 
Also as in Experiment 1, participants were divided into anxiety groups according 
to BAI quartile - low anxiety (BAI scores of 0 to 3, n = 36), medium-low anxiety 
(scores of 4 to 8, n = 40), medium-high anxiety (scores of 9 to 13, n = 35), or 
high anxiety (scores of 14 or above, n = 36). By participant report, 0%, 10%, 6% 
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and 19% of participants in each quartile (respectively) had undergone formal 
treatment for anxiety during the past year. 
 
Word Retrieval Task 
 
 The dependent variables in the word retrieval task were calculated in an 
identical way to those in the word stem completion and word association tasks of 
Experiment 1. As Table 3 shows, neither adjusted for baseline positive nor 
adjusted for baseline negative target word production was related to either BDI-II 
or BAI score. This means that no mood-congruency effects were shown. For the 
participants as a whole, adjusted for baseline primed number of target words 
produced was significantly greater than baseline for both the positive stimuli (M 
= 1.23, SD = 1.59, vs. M = - 0.03, SD = 1.24; t[130] = 8.29, p < .001) and the 
negative stimuli (M = 1.27, SD = 1.65, vs. M = -0.02, SD = 1.39; t[130] = 8.41, p 
< .001). This shows that priming occurred.
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Table 3. 
Correlations Between Information Processing Bias Scores and Emotion Measures. 
 
Task Explicit memory Incidental memory Conceptual 
implicit memory 
(word retrieval) 
 Interpretation of 
ambiguity 
(Homophone task) 
 Autobio-
graphical 
pleasantness 
Autobio-
graphical 
specificity 
Emotion measure Number of 
negative words 
recalled (positive 
words recalled as 
covariate) 
Number of negative 
words recalled 
(other words 
recalled as 
covariate) 
Primed positive 
target words 
produced 
(adjusted for 
baseline) 
Primed negative 
target words 
produced (adjusted 
for baseline) 
Number of negative 
interpretations 
made 
Number of 
positive 
interpretations 
made 
Mean rated 
pleasantness 
of events 
Number of 
specific events 
produced 
BDI-II pr = -.015 
 
df = 133 
pr = .037 
p = .336 
df = 128 
r = .028 
 
n = 131 
r = -.021 
 
n = 131 
r = .167 ** 
p = .041 
n = 110 
r = .094 
 
n = 110 
r = - .145 ** 
p = .050 
n = 130 
r = .075 
 
n = 145 
BDI-II somatic factor     r = .144 * 
p = .067 
n = 110 
 r = -.164 ** 
p = .031 
n = 130 
 
BDI-II cognitive-
affective factor 
    r = .176 ** 
p = .033 
n = 110 
 r = -.108  
p = .110 
n = 130 
 
BAI pr = -.102 
 
df = 133 
pr = -.001 
 
df = 128 
r = .087 
 
n = 130 
r = .006 
p = .475 
n = 130 
r = .188 ** 
p = .025 
n = 109 
r = .116 
 
n = 109 
r = -.098 
p = .134 
n = 129 
r = .113 
 
n = 144 
Partial correlation 
with BDI-II 
controlling for BAI 
    pr = .045 
p = .320 
df = 106 
 pr = -.107 
p = .114 
df = 126 
 
Partial correlation 
with BAI controlling 
for BDI-II 
    pr = .097 
p = .160 
df = 106 
 pr = .009 
 
df = 126 
 
 
* indicates near significance (p < .10). ** indicates significant at p < .05. *** indicates significant at p < .01. **** indicates significant at p < .001. All t-tests were one-
tailed. p values for correlations in the direction opposite to that predicted are not reported as one-tailed t-tests have no statistical power in this circumstance.The use of 
two-tailed t-tests would not have produced any additional significant findings. BDI-II factor correlations were calculated only when the BDI-II correlated significantly 
with the relevant variable. Partial correlations were calculated only when the BDI-II or BAI correlated significantly with the relevant variable. 
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Incidental Recall Task 
 
 As for the analysis of the explicit memory task in Experiment 1, the 
dependent variable was the number of negative words recalled, but the number of 
positive words recalled was included as a covariate in the analysis to control for 
general memory ability. As Table 3 shows, memory bias was not significantly 
correlated with either depression or anxiety. Including counterbalancing 
condition as a covariate (to control for the different word lists the participants 
were asked to recall) does not change the pattern of results. 
 
Intentional Recall Task 
 
 As for the analysis of the explicit memory task of Experiment 1, the 
dependent variable was number of negative words recalled. Number of other 
words recalled (positive plus neutral) was included as a covariate to control for 
general memory ability. As Table 3 shows, memory bias was not significantly 
correlated with either depression or anxiety. 
 
Post-hoc Power Calculations for the Wordlist Memory Tasks 
 
A post-hoc power analysis was conducted to gain an idea of whether the failure 
of the experiment to find significant associations between BDI-II score, BAI 
score, explicit memory bias, and implicit priming was due to insufficient 
statistical power. If the true r between bias score and BDI-II or BAI score was 
.15, then to obtain 90% power with 128 participants in a one-tailed correlational 
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t-test would require setting alpha to .33. As Table 3 shows, none of the observed 
correlations were significant by this criterion. Although the post-hoc nature of 
these calculations calls for caution, the results indicate that insufficient power is 
a relatively unlikely explanation of the lack of significant relationships between 
the variables. 
 
Homophone Interpretation Task 
 
 The dependent variables were the number of positive and negative 
homophone interpretations made by the participants. As Table 3 shows, the 
predicted correlation between anxiety score and negative interpretations was 
significant (r = .188, p <  .05), as was the correlation between depression score 
and negative interpretations (r = .167, p < .05). The partial correlation between 
depression and negative interpretations, controlling for anxiety, was 
nonsignificant (pr = .045, p > .10). The partial correlation between anxiety and 
negative interpretations, controlling for depression, was also nonsignificant (pr = 
.097, p > .10). 
 The relationships of the somatic and cognitive factors of depression to 
negative homophone production were also compared. The correlation between 
the somatic factor of depression and negative interpretations was near 
significance (r = .144, p < .10), and the correlation between the cognitive-
affective factor of depression and negative interpretations was significant (r = 
.176, p < .05). The partial correlation of negative interpretations with somatic 
depression, controlling for cognitive depression, was nonsignificant (pr =  -.001, 
p > .10). Similarly, the partial correlation of negative interpretations with 
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cognitive depression, controlling for somatic depression, was nonsignificant (pr 
= .102, p > .10). 
 The correlation between depression and positive homophone 
interpretations made was nonsigificant (r = .094, p > .10), as was the correlation 
between anxiety and positive interpretations (r = .116, p > .10). Post-hoc power 
calculations showed that the lack of significant results was unlikely to be due to 
insufficient power. If the true r between bias score and BDI-II or BAI score was 
.15, then to obtain 90% power with 109 participants in a one-tailed correlational 
t-test would require setting alpha to .38. As Table 3 shows, because both of the 
observed correlations were in the opposite direction to that predicted, neither 
were significant by this criterion. Although the post-hoc nature of these 
calculations calls for caution, the results indicate that insufficient power is a 
relatively unlikely explanation of the lack of significant relationships between the 
variables. 
 The correlations reported are qualitatively similar when all participants 
who completed the tasks were included in the analyses, including those who 
showed understanding of the experiment in the catch question, or were excluded 
from the main analyses because of poor data quality. This shows that the results 
are not an artifact of the exclusion criteria used. 
 The mean number of negative homophone interpretations made by the 
different groups of participants are illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. The differences 
between the top and bottom groups are near significance for both depression (M 
= 6.47, SD = 1.43, vs. M = 7.00, SD = 1.61, t[93] = 1.39, p < .10) and anxiety (M 
= 6.56, SD = 1.50, vs. M = 7.11, SD = 1.20, t[51] = 1.47, p < .10). 
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Figure 6. 
Relationship between depression category and number of negative homophone 
interpretations made. 
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Figure 7. 
Relationship between anxiety quartile and number of negative homophone 
interpretations made. 
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Autobiographical Recall Valence Task 
 
 The dependent variable was the mean self-rated pleasantness of the 
autobiographical events reported by the participants. As Table 3 shows, the 
predicted correlation between depression and autobiographical pleasantness was 
significant (r = - .145, p =  .05), but the correlation between anxiety and 
autobiographical pleasantness was nonsignificant (r = - .098, p > .10). The partial 
correlation between depression and pleasantness, controlling for anxiety, was not 
significant (pr = -.107, p > .10). The partial correlation between anxiety and 
pleasantness, controlling for depression, was also nonsignificant (pr = .009, p > 
.10). 
 The relationships of the somatic and cognitive factors of depression to 
autobiographical pleasantness were also compared. The correlation between the 
somatic factor of depression and negative interpretations was significant (r = -
.164, p < .05), but the correlation between the cognitive-affective factor of 
depression and pleasantness was nonsignificant (r = -.108, p > .10). The partial 
correlation of pleasantness with somatic depression, controlling for cognitive 
depression, was near significance (pr = -.131, p < .10). The partial correlation of 
pleasantness with cognitive depression, controlling for somatic depression, was 
nonsignificant (pr = .043, p > .10). 
 Again, the results for this task are qualitatively similar when all 
participant data is included, regardless of understanding of the experimental 
purpose or exclusion from the main analyses for lack of data quality. This shows 
that the results are not an artifact of the exclusion criteria used. 
Emotion-Congruent Information Processing  112 
 The mean self-rated autobiographical pleasantness of the events reported 
by the different depression groups is illustrated in Figure 8. The difference 
between the nondepressed and depressed-dysphoric group neared significance 
(M = 5.60, SD = 1.22, vs. M = 5.23, SD = 0.96, t[109] = 1.27, p = .10). 
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Figure 8. 
Relationship between depression category and self-rated pleasantness of 
autobiographical events recalled in response to neutral cues. 
 
Emotion-Congruent Information Processing  114 
Autobiographical Recall Specificity 
 
 The dependent variable was the number of specific memories produced 
by the participants, as rated by the experimenter. Past research has shown that 
independent raters can reliably discriminate specific memories from nonspecific 
memories (Williams & Dritschel, 1988). As shown in Table 3, number of 
specific memories produced was not significantly related to depression (r = .075, 
p > .10) or anxiety (r = .113, p > .10). Post-hoc power calculations showed that 
the lack of significant results was unlikely to be due to insufficient power. If the 
true r between bias score and BDI-II or BAI score was .15, then to obtain 90% 
power with 145 participants in a one-tailed correlational t-test would require 
setting alpha to .29. As Table 3 shows, because both of the observed correlations 
were in the opposite direction to that predicted, neither were significant by this 
criterion. Although the post-hoc nature of these calculations calls for caution, the 
results indicate that insufficient power is a relatively unlikely explanation of the 
lack of significant relationships between the variables. 
Because past authors have argued that overgeneral recall is related only to 
clinical levels of distress, those participants who reported they had undergone 
psychotherapeutic or pharamacological treatment for depression within the last 
year were selected for analysis. This group (n = 17) was compared to the other 
participants (n = 126). There was no significant between-group difference in 
number of specific memories produced (M = 9.15, SD = 1.26, vs. M = 9.12, SD 
= 1.22, t[143] = .10, p > .10).  
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Additional Planned Analyses 
 
Because all predictions being tested by the comparisons in this section were 
based on theory rather than informed by prior research findings, two-tailed rather 
than one-tailed t-tests were conducted. 
 
Hemispheric Preference Test (PT) Score and Autobiographical Recall Specificity 
 
Higher scores on the PT indicate greater reliance on left-hemisphere 
thinking style. It was predicted that hemisphericity would relate to specificity of 
autobiographical memory, but no prediction was made as to the direction of this 
relationship. Left-hemispheric thinking style was related to greater specificity of 
recalled events (r = .253, p < .01). The cases where participants produced 
nonspecific memories were broken down into type – categorical memories, 
extended memories, non-event memories, and failures to answer (Williams & 
Dritschel, 1992). Left-hemispheric thinking was related to the production of 
fewer categorical memories (r = -.316, p < .001), but was not significantly related 
to production of extended memories (r = -.110, p > .10) or memories that were 
not of events (r = -.089, p >.10). Contrary to the pattern for the other types of 
nonspecific memories, there was a near significant trend for left-hemispheric 
thinking to predict more answers left blank (r = .138, p = .10). 
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Number of Words Recalled in the Explicit Memory Tasks and Autobiographical 
Recall Specificity 
 
It was hypothesized that overgeneral autobiographical memory would be 
associated with poor memory in general. This hypothesis was supported. Number 
of specific memories produced was significantly correlated with number of 
words recalled, totalled across the two explicit memory tasks (r = .195, n = 130, 
p < .05). Because thinking style was also associated with specificity of memory, 
this analysis was repeated using a partial correlation, controlling for thinking 
style. The resulting correlation was significant (pr = .217, df = 123, p < .05). 
Thinking style, controlling for total number of words recalled, was also 
significantly associated with number of specific words produced (pr = .316, df = 
123, p < .001). Thus, better wordlist memory ability and left-hemispheric 
thinking style were independently related to greater autobiographical memory 
specificity. 
 
Hemispheric Preference Test (PT) Score and Homophone Interpretation 
 
Higher scores on the PT indicate greater reliance on left-hemisphere 
thinking style. It was predicted that left-hemisphere dominant individuals would 
produce fewer emotion-related homophones than right-hemisphere dominant 
individuals, for both positive and negative stimuli. The hypothesis was 
supported: PT score was significantly correlated with number of negative 
homophones produced (r = -.195, p < .05, n = 106). It was near significantly 
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correlated with number of positive homophones produced (r = -.188, p < .06, n = 
106), and it was significantly correlated with total number of emotional (positive 
plus negative) homophones produced (r = -.256, p < .01, n = 106). 
 
Additional Analyses 
 
Autobiographical Recall Specificity and Autobiographical Pleasantness 
 
One final association was noted that was not the result of a planned 
comparison. For this reason, it should be interpreted with caution, but it is 
reported because of it’s strength and possible importance. There was a 
correlation between number of specific memories produced and self-rated mean 
pleasantness of autobiographical events (r = -.251, n = 127, p < .01). Breaking 
this down to look at the different kinds of non-specific memories, both 
categorical (r = .248, n = 127, p < .01) and non-event memories (r = .297, n = 
127, p = .001) were significantly and positively associated with mean 
pleasantness rating. Number of extended memories produced was not 
significantly associated with mean pleasantness (r = .029, n = 127, p > .10), 
while number of non-responses was significantly negatively correlated with 
mean pleasantness (r = -.185, n = 127, p < .05). In summary, producing 
categorical and non-event memories is associated with the recall of pleasant 
events, while not recalling any event at all is associated with the recall of 
unpleasant events. 
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Summary of the Findings of Experiments 1 and 2 
 
Relevant to Aim 1. The first main aim of this thesis was to directly 
compare the information processing correlates of anxiety and depression. Table 4 
summarises the overall pattern of results for those tasks where negative mood 
was related to information processing bias. The theory that Williams et al. (1997) 
put forward to explain the relationship between information processing biases 
and anxiety and depression predicts that the two tasks to the left of the grey line, 
wordlist and explicit memory, will be more closely related to depression than to 
anxiety, because these tasks rely on elaboration rather than priming. Williams et 
al.'s (1997) theory also predicts that the three tasks to the right of the grey line, 
deployment of attention, perceptual implicit memory, and homophone 
interpretation, will be more closely related to anxiety than to depression, because 
these tasks rely on priming rather than elaboration. 
Were these predictions supported? There are two ways of examining the 
hypothesis. The first is to simply look at whether anxiety or depression correlate 
significantly with bias score. This is the method that is in effect used when 
existing reviewers compare the results of studies that looked only at anxiety and 
bias to the results of studies that looked only at depression and bias, although the 
present studies have the methodological advantage of eliminating methodological 
differences between studies. Table 4 shows that for both tasks where the model 
predicts that bias will relate to depression, this prediction was supported by a 
significant correlation. In neither case was there a significant association between 
anxiety and bias. Likewise, for the three tasks where the model predicts that bias 
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would relate to anxiety, these predictions were supported by significant 
correlations. However, in two of these cases there were also significant 
correlations between depression and bias, and these correlations were only 
marginally smaller in magnitude than the correlations between anxiety and bias. 
Thus, the results of three of the five comparisons were in line with prediction, 
and two were ambiguous.  
The second way of examining the hypothesis comparing anxiety to 
depression is to look at the partial correlation between each mood measure and 
bias, controlling for the other mood measure. This is a more rigorous test, in that 
a significant correlation demonstrates an effect that is independent of the other 
aspect of mood, but given that anxiety and depression are highly correlated, it is 
also an approach with limited statistical power. In only one case out of the five 
tasks was a partial correlation statistically significant. However, this partial 
correlation was in line with prediction – bias on the word stem task was 
significantly associated with anxiety, even controlling for depression. Moreover, 
the significance of this finding is unlikely to be a chance result of conducting 
several analyses, because it is highly significant (p < .001). Finally, in light of the 
limited statistical power of this kind of comparison, it is noteworthy than in every 
case other than this significant finding, there is a nonsignificant trend in the 
predicted direction. The partial correlations between the mood measure that the 
model predicts should be more important and bias, controlling for the mood 
measure predicted to be less important, has in each case a p of .16 or less5. The 
converse partial correlations have in each case a p of .30 or more. Thus, the 
overall pattern of results is consistent with Williams et al.'s (1997) hypothesis 
                                                 
5 The combined probability of the four non-significant tests obtaining even this very marginal 
level of significance by chance alone is 0.164, or p < .001. 
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that tasks that rely on elaboration are affected by depression, and tasks that rely 
on priming are affected by anxiety.  
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Table 4. 
Summary Comparison of the Correlations of Anxiety and Depression with Cognitive Bias Scores. 
Task Explicit 
memory 
(Experiment 
1) 
Autobiographical 
memory 
(Experiment 2) 
 Attention 
Deployment 
(Experiment 
1) 
Perceptual 
implicit 
memory 
(word 
stem) 
Homophone 
interpretation 
(Experiment 
2) 
Measure of 
emotion 
Negative 
words 
recalled 
(with 
positive 
words 
recalled as a 
covariate) 
Mean self-rated 
pleasantness of 
events 
 Percentage 
of trials 
coloured bar 
replacing 
sad word 
selected 
Primed 
positive 
target 
words 
produced 
(adjusted 
for 
baseline) 
Number of 
negative 
homophone 
interpretations 
Depression 
(BDI – II) 
pr = .120**
p = .047 
df = 194 
r = - .145**
p = .050 
n = 130 
 r = .172**
p = .050 
n = 93 
r = -.009 
p = .453 
n = 193 
r = .167 **
p = .041 
n = 110 
Anxiety  
(HAD – A 
Expt 1, 
BAI Expt 
2) 
pr = .090 
p = .106 
df = 191 
r = -.098 
p = .134 
n = 129 
 r = .195**
p = .031 
n = 92 
r = .189***
p = .004 
n = 193 
r = .188 **
p = .025 
n = 109 
Partial 
correlation 
with 
depression 
controlling 
for anxiety 
pr =  .083 
p = .123 
df = 190 
pr = -.107 
p = .114 
df = 126 
 pr = .055 
p = .303 
df = 89 
pr = -.199ψ
 
df = 187 
pr = .045 
p = .320 
df = 106 
Partial 
correlation 
with 
anxiety 
controlling 
for 
depression 
pr = .022 
p = .381 
df = 190 
pr = .009 
 
df = 126 
 
 pr = .122 
p = .125 
df = 89 
 
pr = 
.270****
p = .000 
df = 187 
pr = .097 
p = .160 
df = 106 
 
** indicates significant at p < .05. *** indicates significant at p < .01. **** indicates 
significant at p < .001. All t-tests were one-tailed. p values for correlations in the 
direction opposite to that predicted are not reported as one-tailed t-tests have no 
statistical power in this circumstance. The use of two-tailed t-tests would have 
produced one additional significant finding, marked ψ, as noted in the results 
section of Experiment 1. This table shows the results for those tasks where a 
significant association between bias and either anxiety or depression was found. 
Results to the left of the grey line are for tasks where it was predicted bias would 
be more closely associated with depression than with anxiety; results to the right 
of the grey line are for tasks where it was predicted that bias would be more 
closely associated with anxiety than with depression. 
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Relevant to Aim 2. The second main aim of this thesis was to test the 
hypothesis that it is the somatic, rather than the cognitive, symptoms of 
depression that are related to information processing biases. Table 5 summarises 
the overall pattern of results for tasks that showed a relationship to depression in 
Experiments 1 and 2. There are two ways of examining the hypothesis. The first 
is to look at whether the somatic and cognitive factors of depression correlate 
significantly with bias score. Table 5 shows that in three of the four cases, the 
somatic factor of depression is significantly correlated with bias; in the other 
case, the association is near significant. Conversely, in only one case is the 
cognitive factor of depression significantly correlated with bias, and in only one 
other case does the association near significance. 
The second way of examining the hypothesis comparing the two factors 
of depression is to look at the partial correlation between each factor score and 
bias, controlling for the other factor. This is a more rigorous test, in that a 
significant correlation demonstrates an effect that is independent of the other 
factor, but given that the two factors are highly correlated, it is also an approach 
with limited statistical power. Table 5 shows that in the case of the deployment 
of attention task, the correlation between the somatic factor and bias remains 
significant controlling for the cognitive factor. Also, in the case of the 
autobiographical pleasantness task, the correlation between the somatic factor 
and bias is near significant, controlling for the cognitive factor. Conversely, in no 
case does the correlation between the cognitive factor and bias near significance, 
controlling for the somatic factor. Thus, the overall pattern of results is consistent 
with the hypothesis that depression-congruent cognitive biases are correlates of 
the somatic, rather than the cognitive, symptoms of depression. 
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Table 5. 
Summary Comparison of the Correlations of Somatic and Cognitive Factors of Depression with Cognitive Bias Scores. 
 
Task Explicit memory 
(Experiment 1) 
Attention Deployment 
(Experiment 1) 
Autobiographical 
memory (Experiment 2) 
Homophone 
interpretation 
(Experiment 2) 
Measure of depression Negative words recalled 
(with positive words 
recalled as a covariate) 
Percentage of trials 
coloured bar replacing 
sad word selected 
Mean self-rated 
pleasantness of events 
Number of negative 
homophone 
interpretations 
BDI – II pr = .120**
p = .047 
df = 194 
r = .172**
p = .050 
n = 93 
r = - .145**
p = .050 
n = 130 
r = .167**
p = .041 
n = 110 
BDI – II somatic factor pr = .124** 
p = .042 
df = 194 
r = .229**
p = .014 
n = 93 
r = -.164**
p = .031 
n = 130 
r = .144*
p = .067 
n = 110 
BDI – II cognitive factor pr = .095*
p = .093 
df = 194 
r = .082 
p = .217 
n = 93 
r = -.108  
p = .110 
n = 130 
r = .176**
p = .033 
n = 110 
Partial correlation with somatic 
factor controlling for cognitive 
factor  
pr = .082 
p = .128 
df = 193 
pr = .240**
p = .011 
df = 90 
pr = -.131*
p = .069 
df = 127 
pr = -.001 
 
df = 107 
Partial correlation with cognitive 
factor controlling for somatic factor 
pr = .016 
p = .410 
df = 193 
pr = -.111 
 
df = 90 
pr = .043 
 
df = 127 
pr = .102 
p = .147 
df = 107 
* indicates near significance (p < .10). ** indicates significant at p < .05. All t-tests were one-tailed. p values for correlations in the direction opposite 
to that predicted are not reported as one-tailed t-tests have no statistical power in this circumstance. The use of two-tailed t-tests would not have 
produced any additional significant findings. Correlations and partial correlations between the somatic and cognitive factors of depression and bias 
were only calculated for cases where there was a significant correlation between total depression score and bias. 
Emotion-Congruent Information Processing  124 
Discussion 
 
Relevant to Aim 1. Several of the experimental hypotheses were 
supported. Autobiographical memory valence was significantly associated with 
depression, but not with anxiety. Partial correlations produced a nonsignificant 
pattern consistent with this conclusion. Also as predicted, the negative 
interpretation of negative-neutral homophones was significantly related to 
anxiety. Negative interpretation was also significantly related to depression. 
Partial correlations were unable to disentangle the effects of depression and 
anxiety, but there was a trend supporting the prediction that anxiety would 
mediate the association. Inconsistent with prediction, there was no significant 
association between either anxiety or depression and interpretation of neutral-
positive homophones. This nonreplication was particularly surprising given that 
insufficient power is a relatively unlikely explanation of the finding, and that the 
neutral-positive homophone interpretation was related to scores on the PT, 
suggesting that individual differences in emotional interpretation were being 
tapped by the task. 
The results of three of the tasks were not consistent with the hypotheses. 
Bias in conceptual implicit memory was expected to relate to depression, but not 
to anxiety; contrary to prediction, it related to neither. When this finding is 
considered in conjunction with the results of the conceptual implicit memory task 
in Experiment 1, it suggests that clinical levels of depression may be required to 
produce implicit memory bias. It was also predicted that bias in the two explicit 
memory tasks would relate to depression, but not to anxiety; again, it related to 
neither. This was unexpected; the two explicit memory tasks in Experiment 2 
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were intended to improve on the methodology of the explicit memory task in 
Experiment 1, which did find a depression-congruent bias. As discussed in the 
results, lack of statistical power is a relatively unlikely explanation for the null 
findings, and as discussed in the introduction, a depression-congruent bias in 
explicit memory is a relatively well-established phenomenon. On the other hand, 
also as discussed in the introduction, there have been a number of other studies, 
with both clinical and nonclinical participants, that have not found depression-
congruent explicit memory biases. It is difficult to determine how many of these 
failures to replicate were due to insufficient statistical power and how many were 
due to methodological differences. The meta-analysis conducted by Matt et al. 
(1992) found no significant evidence that methodological differences influenced 
effect sizes, but it could be that a meta-analysis incorporating the larger database 
of studies that now exists would find different results. In the case of the present 
study, one could speculate that the incidental recall task was contaminated by the 
implicit memory task that intervened between study and test. Similarly, because 
the intentional memory task had a greater number of word stimuli than has been 
commonly used for intentional (rather than incidental) recall tasks, one could 
speculate that this factor may have affected the results. Mapping out the exact 
methodological conditions under which depression-congruent recall occurs is a 
difficult task, because the small effect size involved requires large numbers for 
sufficient power; it will doubtless be a subject of further research. 
Relevant to Aim 2. Some support was obtained for the hypothesis that the 
somatic, rather than cognitive, symptoms of depression are related to information 
processing bias. As predicted, the somatic factor of depression was significantly 
associated with the production of negative autobiographical memories, but the 
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cognitive factor was not. Partial correlations produced a near-significant pattern 
consistent with this conclusion. However, contrary to prediction, the cognitive-
affective factor of depression was significantly associated with negative 
homophone interpretation, but the somatic factor was only near-significantly 
associated with this variable. Partial correlations were nonsignificant, but the 
trend was for the cognitive-affective factor to have the greater influence on 
interpretation. There are two possible interpretations of this finding. First, the 
somatic mediation of the effects of depression on cognitive bias may apply to 
attention and memory, but not to interpretation. Second, the result may have 
occurred because anxiety mediates the relationship between scores on depression 
inventories and interpretative bias; however, as described above, there was no 
significant evidence for this later hypothesis in the current experiment. 
Relevant to Subsidiary Aim 2. The relationships of the mood and other 
variables with autobiographical memory specificity were as predicted. Neither 
anxiety nor depression was related to autobiographical memory specificity. Both 
right hemispheric thinking style and poor explicit word list recall were 
significantly and independently associated with overgeneral memory. 
Unexpectedly, there was also a significant association between number of 
overgeneral memories produced and mean pleasantness of recalled events. 
Relevant to Subsidiary Aim 3. The relationship between thinking style 
and homophone interpretation was consistent with prediction. Right-hemispheric 
thinking style was significantly associated with negative interpretations, near 
significantly associated with positive interpretations, and significantly associated 
with combined number of emotional interpretations. Thus, right-hemispheric 
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thinking style appears to be associated with the interpretation of ambiguous 
material as emotional, regardless of valence. 
 
General Discussion 
 
Implications of Findings Relevant to Aim 1 
 
To address the issue of the differential information processing correlates 
of anxiety and depression, it is useful to summarise the overall pattern of relevant 
results. These results were summarised in Table 4, and they showed support for 
the hypothesis that anxiety is associated with cognitive biases in tasks requiring 
priming, and depression is associated with cognitive biases in tasks requiring 
elaboration. The pattern of findings was consistent with the model put forward 
by Williams et al. (1997). The schema models of Beck et al. (1979) and 
Horowitz et al. (1997), and the network model of Bower (1981), do not predict or 
explain the results.  
 Some caveats apply to this interpretation of the data. Although the overall 
pattern of results is very consistent with Williams et al.'s (1997) model, the 
partial correlations between anxiety and depression were significant in only one 
case. This means that although the overall conclusion can be confidently drawn, 
the application of the general rule to some of the specific cases is uncertain. For 
example, although as predicted performance on the deployment of attention task 
was more strongly related to anxiety than to depression, this difference was not 
significant, and other research has produced inconsistent findings on this issue. 
Unfortunately, the use of partial correlations between highly correlated variables 
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is a technique that requires large sample sizes to obtain sufficient statistical 
power. The present studies had larger samples than most experiments in the area, 
but the results suggest that obtaining sufficient power to definitively test the 
hypothesis would require an even larger sample. In some cases, careful attention 
to methodological detail might also increase statistical power. For example, in 
the homophone interpretation task, there were several items on which one of the 
two response options dominated, with more than 90% of participants responding 
in that way. It is unlikely that these items were involved in the effects that were 
found; therefore, replacing them might increase the effect size and thus statistical 
power. Homophones for which the two possible interpretations have similar 
word frequencies may be particularly useful. 
 In a similar vein, several of the tasks used did not relate to either anxiety 
or depression. As noted in the results, insufficient power is a relatively unlikely 
explanation of these failures to replicate. Future research should examine the 
exact parameters within which an effect will or will not be found; this may shed 
light on when cognitive biases are and are not likely to be exhibited in real-world 
situations. 
A contentious issue, discussed in the introduction, is the generalisation of 
nonclinical research to clinical populations. As also discussed, a nonclinical 
population is ideally suited to the current research questions, because in clinical 
populations anxiety and depression, and somatic and cognitive symptoms of 
depression, will tend to be confounded. Regardless of whether they are relevant 
to clinical populations, the present results are relevant to the understanding of 
cognition and emotion in general. It would be inappropriate to talk about the 
present findings as if the experiments were measuring generalised “distress”; 
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subclinical anxiety and depression showed different correlates, and these 
differences were broadly consistent with those that would be expected in clinical 
populations. However, as well as being relevant to understanding basic emotional 
functioning, there are reasons to believe that the findings of this project are 
relevant to theory and practice in clinical psychology. First, as discussed in the 
introduction, the bulk of evidence supports the idea that depression and anxiety 
are continuous entities. Second, these experiments used the strict depression 
score cut-offs proposed by Kendall et al. (1987) to classify participants as 
dysphoric or dysphoric-depressed. In addition, Experiment 2 used the multiple-
gating procedure that is recommended as best practice for identifying participants 
who have enduring problems with depression (Ingram & Hamilton, 1999) – 
participants were first prescreened for high or low levels of depression, and then 
only classified as dysphoric-depressed if they still showed high levels of distress 
at the time of the experimental session. There was evidence that the use of these 
procedures identified a group of participants for whom depression was a 
problem: 25% of dysphoric participants and 29% of dysphoric-depressed 
participants had undergone formal treatment for depression within the past year. 
Given that epidemiological studies have shown that less than 50% of people who 
meet the criteria for clinical depression in a structured interview have received 
formal treatment for depression (Angst, 1992; Lecrubier, 1998), these results 
suggest that the participants in the dysphoric-depressed group represent a 
significantly distressed population. Thus it seems reasonable to suggest that the 
present results are relevant to theory and practice in clinical psychology. 
Nevertheless, it would be useful to replicate these experiments in a clinical 
population, bearing in mind that it may be necessary to use large samples to 
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obtain sufficient statistical power to distinguish between the variables of interest. 
Similarly, naturalistic studies could be used to complement the results of 
controlled laboratory studies like those of this thesis (Rusting, 1999). 
 Another contentious issue is that of the causal direction of the 
relationship between mood and information processing bias. Mood manipulation 
studies have demonstrated that mood inductions can cause negative biases across 
a range of tasks (for example, Rusting, 1999). This is evidence that negative 
emotion can cause processing biases. However, it is also possible that some of 
the association between information processing and negative mood is caused by 
a reciprocal effect: information processing influencing mood. As mentioned in 
the introduction, researchers have shown a strong interest in this possibility. 
However, although researchers into cognitive biases usually speculate as to 
whether cognitive biases may have some causal effect, direct empirical 
investigation of the possibility has been surprisingly infrequent (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2002). MacLeod and Hagan (1992) conducted the first published 
study on the matter; women who showed more emotional word interference on a 
masked Stroop task showed greater anxiety and depression in response to a 
negative life event. Van den Hout, Tenney, Huygens, Merckelbach, and Kindt 
(1995) conducted a conceptual replication of this study, although they used an ad 
hoc self-rating questionnaire to measure vulnerability, and provided no evidence 
that this questionnaire actually predicts future emotional distress. Rude, 
Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, and Whitney (2002) conducted a study that examined 
cognitive biases on a task involving unscrambling sentences. Cognitive biases at 
the time of the experiment (Time 1) were compared to depression scores 
obtained four to six weeks later (Time 2). Cognitive biases on the task were 
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related to symptoms of depression at Time 2, controlling for depression at Time 
1. However, because each of these studies used a correlational design, it remains 
possible that a third variable causes both information processing bias and 
vulnerability to later depression and anxiety (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). Rude 
et al. (2002) did not control for anxiety at Time 1, and given that anxiety is 
associated with both biased judgement and later depression (Mineka, Watson, & 
Clark, 1998), this makes interpretation of the study ambiguous. A similar 
criticism applies to the MacLeod and Hagan (1992) and Van den Hout et al. 
(1995) studies: personality predicts both current information processing biases 
and future vulnerability to depression and anxiety (Rusting, 1999). Mathews and 
MacLeod (2002) review a series of studies that address these concerns, providing 
the strongest evidence so far that information processing biases can causally 
influence mood. In these experiments, processing biases are induced by 
reinforcing bias with better performance on a task. Participants for whom 
negative bias is induced show a heightened negative mood reaction to a stress 
task, compared with participants for whom positive bias is induced. This appears 
to demonstrate induced cognitive vulnerability to negative emotion. This series 
of studies should be interpreted with caution at this stage, because the bulk of the 
studies have yet to be published and subjected to public scrutiny. In sum, the 
existing body of research seems to suggest a reciprocal relationship between 
processing bias and negative emotion, but research demonstrating that negative 
biases cause negative emotion is best considered preliminary at this stage. 
 Because the present experiments were correlational in nature, causal 
direction cannot be inferred from their results. This thesis has suggested that 
anxiety and depression have different effects on different information processes. 
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However, it is also possible that biases in different information processing 
systems have different effects on anxiety and depression: for example, negative 
biases in attention may lead to anxiety, while negative biases in memory may 
lead to depression. Finally, both explanations may apply. Studies that examine 
the effects of inducing biases in different kinds of processes on anxiety versus 
depression would help to resolve this issue. Likewise, studies that specifically 
induce anxious or depressed mood, rather than generally negative affect, could 
examine any subsequent differences in the kinds of information processing bias 
that are shown. 
 Experiment 2 had particular methodological strengths that improve over 
much existing research in the area. Demand effects have been cited as a possible 
weakness in many existing studies (Blaney, 1986). In Experiment 2, an effort 
was made to disguise the purpose of the tasks, and the question about 
understanding of the experimental purpose showed that this effort was largely 
successful. Participants were excluded if they evidenced understanding of the 
mood-related nature of the tasks, but supplementary analyses showed that the 
results would have been similar without this exclusion process. These findings 
also support the validity of experiments that have not measured participant 
understanding of the experimental purpose, including Experiment 1.  
In addition to demand effects, response bias has also been suggested as a 
possible alternative explanation of mood-congruency in homophone tasks 
(MacLeod, 1990) and explicit memory tasks (Blaney, 1986). However, response 
bias and demand explanations predict that depression and anxiety should both 
result in a generally negative response style across all kinds of tasks. This 
prediction is inconsistent with the finding that only depression produced negative 
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bias in explicit and autobiographical memory, but that both depression and 
anxiety produced a negative interpretative bias on the emotional homophone 
task. There were also cases where depressed and anxious participants had a clear 
opportunity to exhibit a negative response style, but did not (for example, the two 
explicit memory tasks in Experiment 2). Thus, response bias and demand effects 
provide poor explanations of the overall pattern of results across the two 
experiments. 
Tests of bias in autobiographical memory are often criticised on the 
grounds that any group differences shown could be due to veridical differences in 
life history, rather than to information processing bias. The autobiographical 
memory task used in Experiment 2 did not control for life history differences, but 
the veridical difference explanation does not explain why negative recall was 
related to the somatic factor of depression, rather than to the cognitive factor or 
to anxiety. On the other hand, the pattern of information processing biases 
hypothesised in Aims 1 and 2 does predict and explain the results, suggesting 
that information processing biases played a part in producing the results. 
Although controlling for veridical differences was beyond the scope of a 
multiple-task experiment like Experiment 2, future research could do so, for 
example by examining recall of high school grades and checking this against 
school records (Bahrick, Hall, & Berger, 1996). 
 The interaction between anxiety and depression in the perceptual implicit 
memory task was particularly interesting. On this task, there was no significant 
correlation between depression and negative implicit memory, but there was a 
positive correlation between anxiety and implicit memory for negative material, 
and this correlation increased in magnitude when depression was controlled for 
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using a partial correlation. The correlation between depression and implicit 
memory for negative material became negative when anxiety was controlled for. 
Although this correlation was not significant, because it was tested using a one-
tailed t-test intended to detect relationships in the other direction, it was sizable 
in magnitude. Taken at face value, this finding would suggest that “pure” 
depression is associated with a positive bias in perceptual implicit memory. 
These results appear to parallel those found by Lawson and MacLeod (1999) 
using a test of interpretation of ambiguity. Those authors controlled for the 
effects of anxiety by selecting participants who were equal on a measure of 
anxiety but differed on a measure of depression, and they found that those 
participants who were more depressed showed a positive bias. The current 
experiment obtained equivalent results controlling for depression statistically, 
rather than methodologically. As detailed in the introduction, one way to 
interpret these results is to postulate that these biases are related to pure anxiety, 
and not at all to general negative affectivity or depression. This interpretation of 
the results explains the remarkable consistency with which past studies have 
found that perceptual implicit memory biases are related to anxiety, but not to 
depression. In contrast, attentional biases have shown an inconsistent relationship 
with depression; this may be because these biases are influenced by both anxiety 
and general negative affectivity. 
 
Implications of Findings Relevant to Aim 2 
 
To address the issue of the relative effects of the somatic and cognitive 
aspects of depression, it is useful to summarise the overall pattern of relevant 
results. These results were summarised in Table 5, and they showed support for 
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the hypothesis that the somatic, rather than cognitive, symptoms of depression 
are related to information processing bias. Although this conclusion is supported 
by the overall pattern of findings, the significance of the comparisons varied 
from case to case, and by method of analysis. In particular, the results from the 
homophone interpretation task were not consistent with the hypothesis. As 
already discussed, this may be because bias on the homophone task is not 
directly related to depression. However, it may simply be that interpretative bias 
is an exception to the general pattern that was observed; somatic symptoms may 
not influence interpretation more than cognitive symptoms. A similar limitation 
is that the results were found with only a limited range of tasks; investigating a 
wider range of tasks will allow investigators to determine how general the effect 
is. Finally, the current study did not compare the effects of the somatic and 
cognitive symptoms of anxiety on information processing, because the anxiety 
inventories used did not have factor structures that divide the symptoms this way 
(Bjelland et al., 2002; Osman, Barrios, Aukes, Osman, & Markway, 1993). 
Future research could investigate this issue using an inventory designed to 
differentiate the cognitive and somatic symptoms of anxiety, for example, the 
Cognitive-Somatic Anxiety Questionnaire (Schwartz, Davidson, & Goleman, 
1978). 
 A possible alternative interpretation of the findings is that the somatic 
subscale of the BDI-II is a more valid measure of general depression than the 
cognitive scale. This interpretation seems unlikely. The somatic scale contains 
eleven items, and the cognitive-affective scale ten; given that the BDI-II has 
excellent psychometric properties this means that it is unlikely that one subscale 
is substantially more reliable than the other. Similarly, the somatic symptoms of 
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depression (for example, weight change or sleep disturbance) do not have greater 
face validity as measures of depression than do the cognitive symptoms (for 
example, perceiving the self as a failure). Thus, the most plausible interpretation 
of the results is that the greater influence of somatic symptoms is genuine. The 
findings could be further strengthened by using a variety of depression scales to 
compare the relationship between somatic and cognitive symptoms and 
information processing bias. The results also suggest that existing self-report 
scales that contain a predominance of somatic items, for example, the Inventory 
to Diagnose Depression (Zimmerman & Coryell, 1987), might be particularly 
suited to investigations of information processing bias in depression. 
The strong association between somatic symptoms and cognitive biases 
may help explain why studies have found discontinuities between nonclinical and 
clinical samples. The DSM-IV criteria used to diagnose depression in studies of 
clinical depression are predominantly somatic (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992). In 
contrast, many self-report inventories, for example the frequently-used BDI and 
BDI-II, also contain many cognitive symptoms (Basco et al., 1997). In 
combination with the greater symptom severity shown by clinical populations, 
the predominantly somatic content of the DSM-IV criteria may mean that studies 
using these criteria are more likely to find evidence of cognitive biases. 
 As discussed earlier, ideally the present results should be replicated in a 
clinical population, but large sample sizes might be necessary to obtain enough 
statistical power to make the results of such an experiment meaningful. Also as 
noted in the discussion of Aim 1, it is worth considering the causal direction of 
the relationship between information processing bias and mood. Because these 
studies were correlational, they do not show whether the somatic symptoms of 
Emotion-Congruent Information Processing  137 
depression have a greater influence on information processing biases than do the 
cognitive symptoms, or if the relationship is the opposite: information processing 
biases have a greater influence on the somatic symptoms of depression than on 
the cognitive. However, there is theoretical and empirical support for the first 
interpretation, but no obvious theoretical explanation accommodates the second 
interpretation. In particular, the study by Kumari et al. (1998) showed that a 
biological intervention caused negative biases in autobiographical memory, and 
that this effect was not wholly mediated by changes in cognitive symptoms (self-
rated mood). These conclusions could be confirmed by manipulating information 
processing biases and examining whether somatic or cognitive symptoms of 
depression are more strongly affected. If manipulating bias does not affect 
somatic symptoms more, support would be obtained for the hypothesis that the 
causal direction is from somatic symptoms to information processing biases. 
 The findings relevant to Aim 2 suggest that prevailing models of 
information processing bias in anxiety and depression are incomplete or 
incorrect. Schema and network theories predict that cognitive symptoms of 
depression will influence information processing more than somatic symptoms. 
The pattern of results shown in the current project was diametrically opposed to 
this prediction. If this pattern is consistently replicable, then future models of 
information processing bias will need to explicitly include physiological 
processes. The final section of this thesis discusses how such a model might 
work. 
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Implications of Findings Relevant to Subsidiary Aim 1   
 
 Experiment 1 examined whether positive biases on the DOAT are 
characteristic of the general population, as previous authors have concluded, or if 
they are shown by only a minority of people. Previous research selected control 
participants based on particularly low depression or anxiety scores; the present 
study took an unselected sample and examined the responses of participants from 
each quartile of anxiety and depression. Only participants who were in the lower 
50% of depression scores, or the lowest 25% of anxiety scores, showed a positive 
bias on the task. These results suggest that it is not that being unusually high in 
anxiety or depression causes the erosion of a normative positive bias; rather, only 
people who show a below average amount of negative emotion show a positive 
bias. The results reinforce the point that control groups in depression research 
should cover a broad range of normative values rather than being selected for 
being extremely low in depressive symptomatology (Ingram & Hamilton, 
1999)6. The results also suggest that positive attentional biases may be a product 
of particularly positive mood states; future research could further explore this 
finding by looking at the relationship between attention and positive mood. 
 
Implications of Findings Relevant to Subsidiary Aim 2 
 
 Experiment 2 examined whether autobiographical specificity was related 
to a range of factors: anxiety, depression, thinking style, and wordlist memory. 
                                                 
6 The experiments in this thesis accommodated this suggestion by including as the control group 
all participants who scored beneath thirteen on the BDI-II. 
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Consistent with prediction, specificity did not relate to self-reported anxiety or 
depression. Rather it related to thinking style and to wordlist memory ability. 
 This study has confirmed that nonclinically depressed participants do not 
show overgeneral memory, but the puzzle discussed in the introduction remains. 
Why do clinically depressed participants show overgeneral memory, when 
subclinically depressed participants do not? As discussed in the results, there was 
no significant difference in specificity of recall between the participants who had 
recently undergone treatment for depression and the other participants. This 
suggests that overgeneral memory is not always triggered by serious cases of 
depression. It also suggests that overgeneral memory is not due to side effects of 
medication, because the majority of the treated participants were taking 
medication at or shortly before the time of the study. One possibility is that 
overgeneral memory in clinical depression is the product of an interaction 
between depression and IQ, with overgeneral memory only being found in 
depressed individuals with below average intelligence. This would explain why 
the effect is not found in student populations, who are generally of above average 
intelligence (Crawford & Allan, 1997), but the issue remains a matter for further 
research. 
 Specificity of memories was, however, related to wordlist recall ability. 
This is consistent with the speculation that the processes that cause overgeneral 
recall may be the same as those that cause poor wordlist memory in depression. 
However, the relationship was not as strong as might have been expected – a 
correlation of .20, compared with a correlation of .25 between thinking style and 
specificity. It is possible that specificity is related to general intelligence rather 
than specifically to memory; future research could examine this. An experiment 
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designed to examine this particular issue would also benefit from including a task 
measuring motivation and effort. 
Interestingly, the relationship between thinking style and specificity of 
recall was opposite in direction to that found by Merckelbach et al. (1996). These 
authors predicted that people with a right-hemispheric dominant thinking style 
would pay less attention to detail and would thus be more likely to produce 
overgeneral memories. However, they found the opposite: right-hemispheric 
thinkers produced more specific memories. The current project found results in 
line with their original hypothesis: left-hemispheric thinkers produced more 
specific memories. The main difference between the two studies is that 
Merckelbach et al. (1996) used only emotional cues to trigger memories, and the 
current study used only neutral cues. One possible explanation for the pattern of 
results is that left-hemispheric thinkers could be generally better at reporting 
specific memories, but right-hemispheric thinkers particularly good at recalling 
emotion-related information7. This hypothesis could be better tested in an 
experiment that measured thinking style and specificity of recall in response to 
both neutral and emotional cues. A simple distinction between holistic and 
analytical thinking (Iaccino, 1993) does not provide an obvious explanation of 
the contrasting results of the present study and that of Merckelbach et al. (1996), 
but a more detailed examination of theories of hemispheric specialisation would 
lead this thesis too far astray from its main aims. This could be an area for future 
theory development and research. 
 
                                                 
7 This possibility is supported by evidence that the right hemisphere shows specialization for the 
processing of emotional information (Mandal et al., 1996). 
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Implications of Findings Relevant to Subsidiary Aim 3 
 
 As predicted, right-hemispheric thinking was related to the production of 
more emotional homophones, both positive and negative. This finding is 
consistent with arguments that the right hemisphere of the brain plays a special 
role in the processing of emotion (Borod et al., 2002). We measured hemispheric 
dominance indirectly, using a paper-and-pencil test, but there is evidence that 
responses on the test do relate to measurable physiological differences 
(Merckelbach, Muris, Pool et al., 1996). The PT contains very little explicit 
reference to emotion8, which makes the test’s relationship with a behavioural 
index of emotional responding quite striking. Researchers have already started to 
look at the relationship between brain functioning and positive or negative 
cognitive biases (Deldin et al., 2001; Gotlib, Ranganath, & Rosenfeld, 1998); the 
present data suggest that it would also be productive to look at brain functioning 
and bias towards emotional material regardless of valence. The interaction 
between the two forms of biases (positive-negative and nonemotional-emotional) 
would also be an interesting area of study. Finally, it would be revealing to see 
whether the PT relates to other emotion-related tasks; for example, right-
hemispheric dominant individuals may show attentional biases towards 
emotional material on the DOAT and dot-probe tasks. 
 
                                                 
8 Of the twenty questions, only three contain emotional content, and this content is tangential. 
These questions are “Do you base your decisions on objective facts rather than feelings?”, “Do 
you use a playful approach to problem solving?”, and “Do you use a serious, all business 
approach to problem solving?” 
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Implications of Findings Relevant to Subsidiary Aim 4 
 
 The overall findings have mixed implications for the possibility of using 
biases in information processing to estimate level of depression. In each 
experiment, only two of the five tasks were significantly related to depression, 
and in each case the relationship was closer to small than to moderate in Cohen's 
(1988) effect size terms, with correlations ranging from .12 to .17 in magnitude. 
This means that neither of the two task batteries examined in the current project 
would, by themselves, be useful measures of depression. If the four depression-
related tasks were put together in one experiment, and similar correlations 
between depression and bias were obtained, the resulting battery could be more 
useful, but probably only for group, rather than individual, comparisons; this 
possibility requires investigation. Even a battery that was only reliable when 
looking at differences between large groups could be useful for theoretical 
research in areas where differences in willingness to report symptoms are 
suspected to be an issue, for example, examinations of gender differences. It 
might also be possible to increase the tasks’ relationships with depression using 
methodological refinements, as discussed under Aim 1. When compared to some 
results that have been reported in the literature, like the correlation between bias 
and depression of .44 reported by Dalgleish (1995), these results are 
disappointing. However, in retrospect this was to be expected; the published 
literature is likely to be biased in favour of significant findings, and given small 
sample sizes this means large effect sizes (Meehl, 1990). Also, some strategies 
that have been used to select participants are likely to inflate obtained effect 
sizes, compared to those that would be found using an unselected sample (Coyne, 
Emotion-Congruent Information Processing  143 
1994). In sum, developing an information processing measure of depression 
remains an elusive goal. Reaching it will require continuing to refine different 
tasks, and then eventually conducting large-scale studies. 
 
Implications of the Overall Project 
 
The main aims of the project involved comparing the effects of anxiety 
and depression, and comparing the effects of the somatic and cognitive 
symptoms of depression. Both areas of investigation produced results that can 
not be easily explained by the traditional cognitive models (Beck et al., 1979; 
Bower, 1981; Horowitz et al., 1997). Can more recent models of cognition and 
emotion provide a better fit to the data? This section describes how they might. 
It is worth emphasizing that cognitive-level models are essential to the 
explanation of cognitive biases in emotion, and that the present results do not 
argue against this. Modelling the form and function of information processing 
and describing the biological structures that carry out this processing are related 
but distinct and equally important enterprises9 (Ilardi & Feldman, 2001; 
Teasdale, 1999). Rather, cognitive models will need to include explanations of 
the differences between anxiety and depression, and of the close association 
between the somatic symptoms of depression and processing bias. Certain recent 
cognitive models are able to accommodate such explanations. As discussed in the 
introduction, Williams et al. (1997) have proposed a model of how depression 
and anxiety affect information processing. They also described how this model 
                                                 
9 Some have argued that findings from biological neuroscience are not relevant to the 
understanding of how the mind works (Coltheart, 2002). However, others strongly disagree 
(Ilardi & Feldman, 2001). For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that it is difficult to 
provide an account of the close association of the somatic symptoms of depression with 
information processing bias without discussing the biology of the brain. 
Emotion-Congruent Information Processing  144 
could fit within each of two larger models of information processing, the 
Multiple-Entry Memory system (MEM) and Interacting Cognitive Subsystems 
(ICS). Teasdale (1999) has drawn parallels between ICS and what is known 
about the brain and emotion, and so it is possible to map Williams et al.'s (1997) 
explanation on to biological structures. As discussed below, this two-level model 
also provides a possible explanation for the close association between the 
somatic symptoms of depression and information processing bias.  
ICS is a general model of cognition that has been applied in detail to 
cognition-emotion relations (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). The basic tenet of the 
model is that cognitions come in qualitatively different forms. Relatively 
unprocessed perceptual information is represented in sensory codes, and 
somewhat more processed information is represented in speech and visual object 
codes. Regularities in speech and visual objects are encoded as meanings. For 
example, multiple sightings of one object on top of another, combined with 
hearing the speech code “above” or “on top of” could be used to construct a 
meaning code signifying the concept of “above” (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). 
Most importantly, meanings can be propositional (cold, rational, explicit) or 
implicational (hot, implicit)10. Emotion is conceptualised as activation of certain 
implicational meanings. Memories for information in the different mental codes 
are stored separately, and specific processes are needed to transform information 
from one type of code to another. 
Williams et al. (1997) suggest that the distinct processing biases 
associated with anxiety and depression could be explained within the ICS model. 
They suggest that implicational codes for anxiety may be tightly bound to 
                                                 
10 A propositional/implicational distinction has also been proposed by earlier authors, for 
example,  Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987). 
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sensory codes; thus, when the anxiety code is activated, sensory processes are 
affected. In contrast, the implicational codes for depression may be tightly bound 
to propositional codes; thus, when the depression code is activated, processing of 
meaning is affected. This explanation is an elaboration and extension of Williams 
et al.'s (1988, 1997) original priming-elaboration distinction. 
Cognitive models like ICS provide ideas as to how anxiety and 
depression might produce different effects on information processing, but they 
leave unanswered the question of why they should do so. Functional approaches 
to emotion do suggest such an explanation. Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) 
suggest that anxiety evolved to promote vigilance for danger. Biased attention 
and judgement serve this goal (Mathews, 1990). It also makes sense that anxiety 
would work at the perceptual level, serving to rapidly identify dangerous stimuli. 
This may explain why anxiety affects perceptual implicit memory. Similarly, 
Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) suggest that depression evolved to promote 
withdrawal from unproductive goals and the establishment of new ones. Biased 
memory may help with this goal, by forcing the individual to focus on the 
negative consequences of current patterns of behaviour. It also makes sense that 
depression would work at the conceptual level, serving to identify behaviours 
that should be avoided (Williams et al., 1997). 
The argument that the functional differences between anxiety and 
depression are the product of evolution suggests that they may be served by 
specific, evolved, and phylogenetically old structures in the brain. No-one has yet 
provided a model of how the different processes that are associated with anxiety 
and depression might map onto biological structures. However, Teasdale (1999) 
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has described how ICS could map onto these structures, which provides a useful 
start for thinking about the issue. First, the biology. 
Gray (1982) based his influential theory of the neuropsychology of 
anxiety on the concept of a behavioural inhibition system (BIS). The concept of 
the BIS was based on animal data showing that novel stimuli, or stimuli 
signalling potential punishment or nonreward, triggered a specific set of 
responses. Anxiolytic drugs selectively prevented this set of responses. The BIS 
is the system that produces these responses, and Gray (1982) operationalises 
anxiety as an increase in activity in the BIS. Gray (1982) describes evidence that 
the septo-hippocampal system is particularly important in the functioning of the 
BIS, and more recent evidence has generally supported this idea (Buck, 1999).  
The amygdala is a region of the brain that is highly interconnected with 
the septo-hippocampal system (Buck, 1999). LeDoux (1995, 2000) argues that 
the amygdala plays a particularly important role in fear. He presents evidence 
that a specific part of the amygdala processes sensory stimuli and triggers fear 
reactions. The amygdala receives sensory stimuli in highly processed form from 
cortical structures, and in less processed form from the thalamic sensory relay 
structures. The latter route allows rapid responses to signs of threat. Fear 
conditioning can occur to information received from either source. In addition, 
the model suggests that the hippocampus interacts with the amygdala to 
modulate the fear response. This lets conditioned fear responses be affected by 
context; thus the organism can respond to a stimulus as threatening in one 
situation, but not in another. Finally, Rolls and Treves (1998) observe that the 
amygdala has neurons that project back to many of the areas that supply it with 
information. These authors argue that the physiological characteristics of these 
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neurons, and the way that they fit into the organisation of the brain, suggest that 
they influence recall and attention. 
Teasdale (1999) describes how his cognitive ICS model may map onto 
LeDoux’s neuropsychological model. Teasdale’s model is one of cognition and 
emotion in general, and LeDoux’s is primarily a model of fear conditioning, so it 
might seem to be a stretched comparison. However, Teasdale (1999) argues that 
LeDoux’s model is likely to be relevant to at least some other emotions. In 
particular, the amygdala appears to be involved in both anxiety and depression 
(Buck, 1999), and neuroimaging studies have shown that activity in this area is 
elevated in both these states (Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke, & Putnam, 2002). 
 Teasdale's (1999) mapping between ICS and LeDoux’s model suggests 
that the amygdala functions to transform sensory or propositional codes to 
implicational codes. Sensory code is received via the thalamic sensory relay 
structures, propositional code representing current stimuli is received from 
cortical structures, and propositional code representing past events is received 
from the hippocampus. It is useful to consider the joint implications of Williams 
et al.'s (1997) mapping between their own theory and ICS, Teasdale's (1999) 
mapping between ICS and LeDoux’s model, and Rolls and Treves' (1998) 
argument that the amygdala influences information processing. Combining these 
ideas, it is possible to speculate as to how the different effects of anxiety and 
depression may be manifested in neural terms. The information processing 
effects of depression may be mediated at the interfaces between cortical 
structures and the amygdala, and between the hippocampus and the amygdala. 
The amygdala does not have the anatomical capacity to send information directly 
back to the thalamus, but it does back project to early and late sensory processing 
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areas (LeDoux, 1995), and it is these projections that may be particularly affected 
by anxiety. These hypotheses could be tested using functional imaging to 
examine the activity of the connections between these areas in participants with 
emotional disorders, as advocated by Davidson et al. (2002). 
Thus, we can see how cognitive, evolutionary, and biological 
explanations of the different effects of anxiety and depression might be 
constructed and integrated. This framework may also help explain the close 
association between the somatic symptoms of depression and information 
processing bias. The hippocampus, the amygdala, and the hypothalamus are 
often grouped together and called the limbic system11 (Buck, 1999). As well as 
its involvement in anxiety and depression, the limbic system controls drive, 
experience of pleasure, the endocrine system, sleep, appetite, and libido (Shelton 
et al., 1991). Thus, it is likely that the limbic system is involved in the somatic 
symptoms of depression (Shelton et al., 1991). The majority of items contained 
in the somatic scale of the BDI-II concern bodily functions that are controlled by 
the limbic system – “loss of pleasure, loss of interest, loss of energy, changes in 
sleep, changes in appetite, tiredness-fatigue, and loss of interest in sex”12 (Dozois 
et al., 1998, p. 86). The association between these symptoms and information 
processing bias suggests that, consistent with Teasdale's (1999) speculation, 
depression-congruent bias may also be controlled by the limbic system. In this 
light, the involvement of the hippocampus in explicit memory (Teasdale, 1999), 
and of the amygdala in threat evaluation (LeDoux, 1995), appear especially 
interesting. 
                                                 
11 LeDoux (1996) argues that neuroscientists should postulate specific circuits rather than using 
the term limbic system, but the term is useful for descriptive purposes (Buck, 1999). 
12 The other symptoms loading on this scale are “crying, agitation, and loss of concentration” 
(Dozois et al., 1998, p. 86). 
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This has been a necessarily brief and speculative explanation of the 
present results, but if the results are consistently replicable, then it is an 
explanation that could be further tested and developed. Future research could 
also directly examine the relationship between information processing biases and 
specific brain activity (Davidson et al., 2002). As Teasdale (1999) argues, 
comparing cognitive and biological levels of analysis should serve to refine and 
constrain explanations at both levels. 
It seems fitting to close by turning to the concerns that inspired Beck’s 
theory, and thus first inspired research into cognition and emotion. What are the 
implications of the present results for the treatment of anxiety and depression? 
Segal, Lau, and Rokke (1999) have suggested that cognitive therapists 
could conceptualise their treatments as working by counteracting cognitive 
biases. It may also be helpful to explicitly tell depressed and anxious individuals 
about the way that their mood states can bias the way that they process 
information about the world. The present results extend this recommendation, 
and imply that clinicians can tell depressed clients that these biases are 
neurobiologically caused. Some clients may find this information helpful or 
reassuring, because it suggests that the biases are normal biological processes 
rather than personal failings. (It would also be important to emphasize that the 
therapist will teach the client cognitive strategies that have been demonstrated to 
help overcome the biases). The results also suggest that interventions for anxiety 
may profit by focussing on changing attentional processes, while interventions 
for depression may profit by focussing on changing memory processes. More 
speculatively, Mathews and MacLeod (2002) reviewed evidence that 
experimentally induced information processing biases influenced mood. It may 
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be possible to develop this paradigm into a component of a treatment package. If 
so, it may be that inductions of positive bias in attention and judgement are 
especially efficacious in the treatment of anxiety, and inductions of positive bias 
in memory are especially efficacious in the treatment of depression. 
This thesis has shown that anxiety and depression have different effects 
on information processing, and has suggested that the effects of depression on 
information processing are biologically mediated. This final section has shown 
that these findings make sense in the context of recent cognitive and biological 
models of emotion, and also make sense from an evolutionary perspective. 
Further progress in specifying the relations between information processing and 
emotion may help integrate cognitive and biological levels of understanding 
(LeDoux, 2000). Ultimately, this project may help to build a model that can 
integrate knowledge across areas that are now disparate, and advance both our 
understanding of ourselves and the treatment of disorders that are so very 
distressing to so many. 
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